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THE QUANTUM TECHNOLOGY ECOSYSTEM – EXPLAINED
Posted on March 22, 2022 by steve blank
If you think you understand quantum mechanics,
you don’t understand quantum mechanics
Richard Feynman
IBM Quantum Computer
Tens of billions of public and private capital are being invested in Quantum
technologies. Countries across the world have realized that quantum technologies
can be a major disruptor of existing businesses and change the balance of
military power. So much so, that they have collectively invested ~$24 billion in
in quantum research and applications.
At the same time, a week doesn’t go by without another story about a quantum
technology milestone or another quantum company getting funded. Quantum has
moved out of the lab and is now the focus of commercial companies and investors.
In 2021 venture capital funds invested over $2 billion in 90+ Quantum technology
companies. Over a $1 billion of it going to Quantum computing companies. In the
last six months quantum computing companies IonQ, D-Wave and Rigetti went public
at valuations close to a billion and half dollars. Pretty amazing for computers
that won’t be any better than existing systems for at least another decade – or
more. So why the excitement about quantum?
THE QUANTUM MARKET OPPORTUNITY
While most of the IPOs have been in Quantum Computing, Quantum technologies are
used in three very different and distinct markets: Quantum Computing, Quantum
Communications and Quantum Sensing and Metrology.
All of three of these markets have the potential for being disruptive. In time
Quantum computing could obsolete existing cryptography systems, but viable
commercial applications are still speculative. Quantum communications could
allow secure networking but are not a viable near-term business. Quantum
sensors could create new types of medical devices, as well as new classes of
military applications, but are still far from a scalable business.
It’s a pretty safe bet that 1) the largest commercial applications of quantum
technologies won’t be the ones these companies currently think they’re going to
be, and 2) defense applications using quantum technologies will come first. 3)
if and when they do show up they’ll destroy existing businesses and create new
ones.
We’ll describe each of these market segments in detail. But first a description
of some quantum concepts.
KEY QUANTUM CONCEPTS
Skip this section if all you want to know is that 1) quantum works, 2) yes, it
is magic.
Quantum – The word “Quantum” refers to quantum mechanics which explains the
behavior and properties of atomic or subatomic particles, such as electrons,
neutrinos, and photons.
Superposition – quantum particles exist in many possible states at the same
time. So a particle is described as a “superposition” of all those possible
states. They fluctuate until observed and measured. Superposition underpins a
number of potential quantum computing applications.
Entanglement – is what Einstein called “spooky action at a distance.” Two or
more quantum objects can be linked so that measurement of one dictates the
outcomes for the other, regardless of how far apart they are. Entanglement
underpins a number of potential quantum communications applications.
Observation – Superposition and entanglement only exist as long as quantum
particles are not observed or measured. If you observe the quantum state you can
get information, but it results in the collapse of the quantum system.
Qubit – is short for a quantum bit. It is a quantum computing element that
leverages the principle of superposition to encode information via one of four
methods: spin, trapped atoms and ions, photons, or superconducting circuits.
Quantum Computers – Background
Quantum computers are a really cool idea. They harness the unique behavior of
quantum physics—such as superposition, entanglement, and quantum
interference—and apply it to computing.
In a classical computer transistors can represent two states – either a 0 or 1.
Instead of transistors Quantum computers use quantum bits (called qubits.)
Qubits exist in superposition – both in 0 and 1 state simultaneously.
Classic computers use transistors as the physical building blocks of logic. In
quantum computers they may use trapped ions, superconducting loops, quantum dots
or vacancies in a diamond. The jury is still out.
In a classic computer 2-14 transistors make up the seven basic logic gates (AND,
OR, NAND, etc.) In a quantum computer building a single logical Qubit require a
minimum of 9 but more likely 100’s or thousands of physical Qubits (to make up
for error correction, stability, decoherence and fault tolerance.)
In a classical computer compute-power increases linearly with the number of
transistors and clock speed. In a Quantum computer compute-power increases
exponentially with the addition of each logical qubit.
But qubits have high error rates and need to be ultracold. In contrast classical
computers have very low error rates and operate at room temperature.
Finally, classical computers are great for general purpose computing. But
quantum computers can theoretically solve some complex algorithms/ problems
exponentially faster than a classical computer. And with a sufficient number of
logical Qubits they can become a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer
(CRQC). And this is where Quantum computers become very interesting and
relevant for both commercial and national security. (More below.)
TYPES OF QUANTUM COMPUTERS
Quantum computers could potentially do things at speeds current computers
cannot. Think of the difference of how fast you can count on your fingers versus
how fast today’s computers can count. That’s the same order of magnitude
speed-up a quantum computer could have over today’s computers for certain
applications.
Quantum computers fall into four categories:
1. Quantum Emulator/Simulator
2. Quantum Annealer
3. NISQ – Noisy Intermediate Scale Quantum
4. Universal Quantum Computer – which can be a Cryptographically Relevant
Quantum Computer (CRQC)
When you remove all the marketing hype, the only type that matters is #4 – a
Universal Quantum Computer. And we’re at least a decade or more away from having
those.
Quantum Emulator/Simulator
These are classical computers that you can buy today that simulate quantum
algorithms. They make it easy to test and debug a quantum algorithm that someday
may be able to run on a Universal Quantum Computer. Since they don’t use any
quantum hardware they are no faster than standard computers.
Quantum Annealer is a special purpose quantum computer designed to only run
combinatorial optimization problems, not general-purpose computing, or
cryptography problems. D-Wave has defined and owned this space. While they have
more physical Qubits than any other current system they are not organized as
gate-based logical qubits. Currently this is a nascent commercial technology in
search of a future viable market.
Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) computers. Think of these as prototypes
of a Universal Quantum Computer – with several orders of magnitude fewer bits.
(They currently have 50-100 qubits, limited gate depths, and short coherence
times.) As they are short several orders of magnitude of Qubits, NISQ computers
cannot perform any useful computation, however they are a necessary phase in the
learning, especially to drive total system and software learning in parallel to
the hardware development. Think of them as the training wheels for future
universal quantum computers.
Universal Quantum Computers / Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers
(CRQC)
This is the ultimate goal. If you could build a universal quantum computer with
fault tolerance (i.e. millions of error corrected physical qubits resulting in
thousands of logical Qubits), you could run quantum algorithms in cryptography,
search and optimization, quantum systems simulations, and linear equations
solvers. (See here for a list of hundreds quantum algorithms.) These all would
dramatically outperform classical computation on large complex problems that
grow exponentially as more variables are considered. Classical computers can’t
attack these problems in reasonable times without so many approximations that
the result is useless. We simply run out of time and transistors with classical
computing on these problems. These special algorithms are what make quantum
computers potentially valuable. For example, Grover’s algorithm solves the
problem for the unstructured search of data. Further, quantum computers are very
good at minimization / optimizations…think optimizing complex supply chains,
energy states to form complex molecules, financial models, etc.
However, while all of these algorithms might have commercial potential one day,
no one has yet to come up with a use for them that would radically transform any
business or military application. Except for one – and that one keeps people
awake at night.
It’s Shor’s algorithm for integer factorization – an algorithm that underlies
much of existing public cryptography systems.
The security of today’s public key cryptography systems rests on the assumption
that breaking into those with a thousand or more digits is practically
impossible. It requires factoring into large prime numbers (e.g., RSA) or
elliptic curve (e.g., ECDSA, ECDH) or finite fields (DSA) that can’t be done
with any type of classic computer regardless of how large. Shor’s factorization
algorithm can crack these codes if run on a Universal Quantum Computer. Uh-oh!
Impact of a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC) Skip this section
if you don’t care about cryptography.
Not only would a Universal Quantum Computer running Shor’s algorithm make
today’s public key algorithms (used for asymmetric key exchanges and digital
signatures) useless, someone can implement a “harvest-now-and-decrypt-later”
attack to record encrypted documents now with intent to decrypt them in the
future. That means everything you send encrypted today will be able to be read
retrospectively. Many applications – from ATMs to emails – would be
vulnerable—unless we replace those algorithms with those that are
“quantum-safe”.
When Will Current Cryptographic Systems Be Vulnerable?
The good news is that we’re nowhere near having any viable Cryptographically
Relevant Quantum Computer, now or in the next few years. However, you can
estimate when this will happen by calculating how many logical Qubits are needed
to run Shor’s Algorthim and how long it will it take to break these crypto
systems. There are lots of people tracking these numbers (see here and here).
Their estimate is that using 8,194 logical qubits using 22.27 million physical
qubits, it would take a quantum computer 20 minutes to break RSA-2048. The best
estimate is that this might be possible in 8 to 20 years.
Post-Quantum / Quantum-Resistant Codes
That means if you want to protect the content you’re sending now, you need to
migrate to new Post-Quantum /Quantum-Resistant Codes. But there are three things
to consider in doing so:
1. shelf-life time: the number of years the information must be protected by
cyber-systems
2. migration time: the number of years needed to properly and safely migrate
the system to a quantum-safe solution
3. threat timeline: the number of years before threat actors will be able to
break the quantum-vulnerable systems
These new cryptographic systems would secure against both quantum and
conventional computers and can interoperate with existing communication
protocols and networks. The symmetric key algorithms of the Commercial National
Security Algorithm (CNSA) Suite were selected to be secure for national security
systems usage even if a CRQC is developed.
Cryptographic schemes that commercial industry believes are quantum-safe include
lattice-based cryptography, hash trees, multivariate equations, and
super-singular isogeny elliptic curves.
Estimates of when you can actually buy a fully error-corrected quantum computers
vary from “never” to somewhere between 8 to 20 years from now. (Some
optimists believe even earlier.)
QUANTUM COMMUNICATION
Quantum communications ≠ quantum computers. A quantum network’s value comes from
its ability to distribute entanglement. These communication devices manipulate
the quantum properties of photons/particles of light to build Quantum Networks.
This market includes secure quantum key distribution, clock synchronization,
random number generation and networking of quantum military sensors, computers,
and other systems.
Quantum Cryptography/Quantum Key Distribution
Quantum Cryptography/Quantum Key Distribution can distribute keys between
authorized partners connected by a quantum channel and a classical authenticated
channel. It can be implemented via fiber optics or free space transmission.
China transmitted entangled photons (at one pair of entangled particles per
second) over 1,200 km in a satellite link, using the Micius satellite.
The Good: it can detect the presence of an eavesdropper, a feature not provided
in standard cryptography. The Bad: Quantum Key Distribution can’t be implemented
in software or as a service on a network and cannot be easily integrated into
existing network equipment. It lacks flexibility for upgrades or security
patches. Securing and validating Quantum Key Distribution is hard and it’s only
one part of a cryptographic system.
The view from the National Security Agency (NSA) is that quantum-resistant (or
post-quantum) cryptography is a more cost effective and easily maintained
solution than quantum key distribution. NSA does not support the usage of QKD or
QC to protect communications in National Security Systems. (See here.) They do
not anticipate certifying or approving any Quantum Cryptography/Quantum Key
Distribution security products for usage by National Security System customers
unless these limitations are overcome. However, if you’re a commercial company
these systems may be worth exploring.
Quantum Random Number Generators (GRGs)
Commercial Quantum Random Number Generators that use quantum effects
(entanglement) to generate nondeterministic randomness are available today.
(Government agencies can already make quality random numbers and don’t need
these devices.)
Random number generators will remain secure even when a Cryptographically
Relevant Quantum Computer is built.
QUANTUM SENSING AND METROLOGY
Quantum sensors ≠ Quantum computers.
This segment consists of Quantum Sensing (quantum magnetometers, gravimeters,
…), Quantum Timing (precise time measurement and distribution), and Quantum
Imaging (quantum radar, low-SNR imaging, …) Each of these areas can create
entirely new commercial products or entire new industries e.g. new classes of
medical devices and military systems, e.g. anti-submarine warfare, detecting
stealth aircraft, finding hidden tunnels and weapons of mass destruction. Some
of these are achievable in the near term.
Quantum Timing
First-generation quantum timing devices already exist as microwave atomic
clocks. They are used in GPS satellites to triangulate accurate positioning. The
Internet and computer networks use network time servers and the NTP protocol to
receive the atomic clock time from either the GPS system or a radio
transmission.
The next generation of quantum clocks are even more accurate and use
laser-cooled single ions confined together in an electromagnetic ion trap. This
increased accuracy is not only important for scientists attempting to measure
dark matter and gravitational waves, but miniaturized/ more accurate atomic
clocks will allow precision navigation in GPS- degraded/denied areas, e.g. in
commercial and military aircraft, in tunnels and caves, etc.
Quantum Imaging
Quantum imaging is one of the most interesting and near-term applications. First
generation magnetometers such as superconducting quantum interference devices
(SQUIDs) already exist. New quantum sensor types of imaging devices use
entangled light, accelerometers, magnetometers, electrometers, gravity sensors.
These allow measurements of frequency, acceleration, rotation rates, electric
and magnetic fields, photons, or temperature with levels of extreme sensitivity
and accuracy.
These new sensors use a variety of quantum effects: electronic, magnetic, or
vibrational states or spin qubits, neutral atoms, or trapped ions. Or they use
quantum coherence to measure a physical quantity. Or use quantum entanglement to
improve the sensitivity or precision of a measurement, beyond what is possible
classically.
Quantum Imaging applications can have immediate uses in archeology, and
profound military applications. For example, submarine detection using quantum
magnetometers or satellite gravimeters could make the ocean transparent. It
would compromise the survivability of sea-based nuclear deterrent by detecting
and tracking subs deep underwater.
Quantum sensors and quantum radar from companies like Rydberg can be game
changers.
Gravimeters or quantum magnetometers could also detect concealed tunnels,
bunkers, and nuclear materials. Magnetic resonance imaging could remotely ID
chemical and biological agents. Quantum radar or LIDAR would enable extreme
detection of electromagnetic emissions, enhancing ELINT and electronic warfare
capabilities. It can use fewer emissions to get the same detection result, for
better detection accuracy at the same power levels – even detecting stealth
aircraft.
Finally, Ghost imaging uses the quantum properties of light to detect distant
objects using very weak illumination beams that are difficult for the imaged
target to detect. It can increase the accuracy and lessen the amount of
radiation exposed to a patient during x-rays. It can see through smoke and
clouds. Quantum illumination is similar to ghost imaging but could provide an
even greater sensitivity.
National and Commercial Efforts
Countries across the world are making major investments ~$24 billion in 2021 –
in quantum research and applications.
Lessons Learned
> * Quantum technologies are emerging and disruptive to companies and defense
> * Quantum technologies cover Quantum Computing, Quantum Communications and
> Quantum Sensing and Metrology
> * Quantum computing could obsolete existing cryptography systems
> * Quantum communication could allow secure cryptography key distribution
> and networking of quantum sensors and computers
> * Quantum sensors could make the ocean transparent for Anti-submarine
> warfare, create unjammable A2/AD, detect stealth aircraft, find hidden
> tunnels and weapons of mass destruction, etc.
> * A few of these technologies are available now, some in the next 5 years and
> a few are a decade or more out
> * Tens of billions of public and private capital dollars are being invested
> in them
> * Defense applications will come first
> * The largest commercial applications won’t be the ones we currently think
> they’re going to be
> * when they do show up they’ll destroy existing businesses and create new
> ones
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THE SEMICONDUCTOR ECOSYSTEM – EXPLAINED
Posted on January 25, 2022 by steve blank
The last year has seen a ton written about the semiconductor industry: chip
shortages, the CHIPS Act, our dependence on Taiwan and TSMC, China, etc.
But despite all this talk about chips and semiconductors, few understand how the
industry is structured. I’ve found the best way to understand something
complicated is to diagram it out, step by step. So here’s a quick pictorial
tutorial on how the industry works.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE SEMICONDUCTOR ECOSYSTEM
We’re seeing the digital transformation of everything. Semiconductors – chips
that process digital information — are in almost everything: computers, cars,
home appliances, medical equipment, etc. Semiconductor companies will sell $600
billion worth of chips this year.
Looking at the figure below, the industry seems pretty simple. Companies in the
semiconductor ecosystem make chips (the triangle on the left) and sell them to
companies and government agencies (on the right). Those companies and government
agencies then design the chips into systems and devices (e.g. iPhones, PCs,
airplanes, cloud computing, etc.), and sell them to consumers, businesses, and
governments. The revenue of products that contain chips is worth tens of
trillions of dollars.
Yet, given how large it is, the industry remains a mystery to most. If you do
think of the semiconductor industry at all, you may picture workers in bunny
suits in a fab clean room (the chip factory) holding a 12” wafer. Yet it is a
business that manipulates materials an atom at a time and its factories cost 10s
of billions of dollars to build. (By the way, that wafer has two trillion
transistors on it.)
If you were able to look inside the simple triangle representing the
semiconductor industry, instead of a single company making chips, you would find
an industry with hundreds of companies, all dependent on each other. Taken as a
whole it’s pretty overwhelming, so let’s describe one part of the ecosystem at a
time. (Warning – this is a simplified view of a very complex industry.)
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY SEGMENTS
The semiconductor industry has seven different types of companies. Each of these
distinct industry segments feeds its resources up the value chain to the next
until finally a chip factory (a “Fab”) has all the designs, equipment, and
materials necessary to manufacture a chip. Taken from the bottom up these
semiconductor industry segments are:
1. Chip Intellectual Property (IP) Cores
2. Electronic Design Automation (EDA) Tools
3. Specialized Materials
4. Wafer Fab Equipment (WFE)
5. “Fabless” Chip Companies
6. Integrated Device Manufacturers (IDMs)
7. Chip Foundries
8. Outsourced Semiconductor Assembly and Test (OSAT)
The following sections below provide more detail about each of these eight
semiconductor industry segments.
CHIP INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (IP) CORES
* The design of a chip may be owned by a single company, or…
* Some companies license their chip designs – as software building blocks,
called IP Cores – for wide use
* There are over 150 companies that sell chip IP Cores
* For example, Apple licenses IP Cores from ARM as a building block of their
microprocessors in their iPhones and Computers
ELECTRONIC DESIGN AUTOMATION (EDA) TOOLS
* Engineers design chips (adding their own designs on top of any IP cores
they’ve bought) using specialized Electronic Design Automation (EDA) software
* The industry is dominated by three U.S. vendors – Cadence, Mentor (now part
of Siemens) and Synopsys
* It takes a large engineering team using these EDA tools 2-3 years to design a
complex logic chip like a microprocessor used inside a phone, computer or
server. (See the figure of the design process below.)
* Today, as logic chips continue to become more complex, all Electronic Design
Automation companies are beginning to insert Artificial Intelligence aids to
automate and speed up the process
SPECIALIZED MATERIALS AND CHEMICALS
So far our chip is still in software. But to turn it into something tangible
we’re going to have to physically produce it in a chip factory called a “fab.”
The factories that make chips need to buy specialized materials and chemicals:
* Silicon wafers – and to make those they need crystal growing furnaces
* Over 100 Gases are used – bulk gases (oxygen, nitrogen, carbon dioxide,
hydrogen, argon, helium), and other exotic/toxic gases (fluorine, nitrogen
trifluoride, arsine, phosphine, boron trifluoride, diborane, silane, and the
list goes on…)
* Fluids (photoresists, top coats, CMP slurries)
* Photomasks
* Wafer handling equipment, dicing
* RF Generators
WAFER FAB EQUIPMENT (WFE) MAKE THE CHIPS
* These machines physically manufacture the chips
* Five companies dominate the industry – Applied Materials, KLA, LAM, Tokyo
Electron and ASML
* These are some of the most complicated (and expensive) machines on Earth.
They take a slice of an ingot of silicon and manipulate its atoms on and
below its surface
* We’ll explain how these machines are used a bit later on
“FABLESS” CHIP COMPANIES
* Systems companies (Apple, Qualcomm, Nvidia, Amazon, Facebook, etc.) that
previously used off-the-shelf chips now design their own chips.
* They create chip designs (using IP Cores and their own designs) and send the
designs to “foundries” that have “fabs” that manufacture them
* They may use the chips exclusively in their own devices e.g. Apple, Google,
Amazon ….
* Or they may sell the chips to everyone e.g. AMD, Nvidia, Qualcomm, Broadcom…
* They do not own Wafer Fab Equipment or use specialized materials or chemicals
* They do use Chip IP and Electronic Design Software to design the chips
INTEGRATED DEVICE MANUFACTURERS (IDMS)
* Integrated Device Manufacturers (IDMs) design, manufacture (in their own
fabs), and sell their own chips
* They do not make chips for other companies (this is changing rapidly – see
here.)
* There are three categories of IDMs– Memory (e.g. Micron, SK Hynix), Logic
(e.g. Intel), Analog (TI, Analog Devices)
* They have their own “fabs” but may also use foundries
* They use Chip IP and Electronic Design Software to design their chips
* They buy Wafer Fab Equipment and use specialized materials and chemicals
* The average cost of taping out a new leading-edge chip (3nm) is now $500
million
CHIP FOUNDRIES
* Foundries make chips for others in their “fabs”
* They buy and integrate equipment from a variety of manufacturers
* Wafer Fab Equipment and specialized materials and chemicals
* They design unique processes using this equipment to make the chips
* But they don’t design chips
* TSMC in Taiwan is the leader in logic, Samsung is second
* Other fabs specialize in making chips for analog, power, rf, displays, secure
military, etc.
* It costs $20 billon to build a new generation chip (3nm) fabrication plant
FABS
* Fabs are short for fabrication plants – the factory that makes chips
* Integrated Device Manufacturers (IDMs) and Foundries both have fabs. The only
difference is whether they make chips for others to use or sell or make them
for themselves to sell.
* Think of a Fab as analogous to a book printing plant (see figure below)
1. Just as an author writes a book using a word processor, an engineer designs
a chip using electronic design automation tools
2. An author contracts with a publisher who specializes in their genre and then
sends the text to a printing plant. An engineer selects a fab appropriate
for their type of chip (memory, logic, RF, analog)
3. The printing plant buys paper and ink. A fab buys raw materials; silicon,
chemicals, gases
4. The printing plant buys printing machinery, presses, binders, trimmers. The
fab buys wafer fab equipment, etchers, deposition, lithography, testers,
packaging
5. The printing process for a book uses offset lithography, filming, stripping,
blueprints, plate making, binding and trimming. Chips are manufactured in a
complicated process manipulating atoms using etchers, deposition,
lithography. Think of it as an atomic level offset printing. The wafers are
then cut up and the chips are packaged
6. The plant turns out millions of copies of the same book. The plant turns out
millions of copies of the same chip
While this sounds simple, it’s not. Chips are probably the most complicated
products ever manufactured. The diagram below is a simplified version of the
1000+ steps it takes to make a chip.
OUTSOURCED SEMICONDUCTOR ASSEMBLY AND TEST (OSAT)
* Companies that package and test chips made by foundries and IDMs
* OSAT companies take the wafer made by foundries, dice (cut) them up into
individual chips, test them and then package them and ship them to the
customer
FAB ISSUES
* As chips have become denser (with trillions of transistors on a single wafer)
the cost of building fabs have skyrocketed – now >$10 billion for one chip
factory
* One reason is that the cost of the equipment needed to make the chips has
skyrocketed
* Just one advanced lithography machine from ASML, a Dutch company, costs
$150 million
* There are ~500+ machines in a fab (not all as expensive as ASML)
* The fab building is incredibly complex. The clean room where the chips are
made is just the tip of the iceberg of a complex set of plumbing feeding
gases, power, liquids all at the right time and temperature into the wafer
fab equipment
* The multi-billion-dollar cost of staying at the leading edge has meant most
companies have dropped out. In 2001 there were 17 companies making the most
advanced chips. Today there are only two – Samsung in Korea and TSMC in
Taiwan.
* Given that China believes Taiwan is a province of China this could be
problematic for the West.
WHAT’S NEXT – TECHNOLOGY
It’s getting much harder to build chips that are denser, faster, and use less
power, so what’s next?
* Instead of making a single processor do all the work, logic chip designers
have put multiple specialized processors inside of a chip
* Memory chips are now made denser by stacking them 100+ layers high
* As chips are getting more complex to design, which means larger design teams,
and longer time to market, Electronic Design Automation companies are
embedding artificial intelligence to automate parts of the design process
* Wafer equipment manufacturers are designing new equipment to help fabs make
chips with lower power, better performance, optimum area-to-cost, and faster
time to market
WHAT’S NEXT – BUSINESS
The business model of Integrated Device Manufacturers (IDMs) like Intel is
rapidly changing. In the past there was a huge competitive advantage in being
vertically integrated i.e. having your own design tools and fabs. Today, it’s a
disadvantage.
* Foundries have economies of scale and standardization. Rather than having to
invent it all themselves, they can utilize the entire stack of innovation in
the ecosystem. And just focus on manufacturing
* AMD has proven that it’s possible to shift from an IDM to a fabless foundry
model. Intel is trying. They are going to use TSMC as a foundry for their own
chips as well as set up their own foundry
WHAT’S NEXT – GEOPOLITICS
Controlling advanced chip manufacturing in the 21st century may well prove to be
like controlling the oil supply in the 20th. The country that controls this
manufacturing can throttle the military and economic power of others.
* Ensuring a steady supply of chips has become a national priority. (China’s
largest import by $’s are semiconductors – larger than oil)
* Today, both the U.S. and China are rapidly trying to decouple their
semiconductor ecosystems from each other; China is pouring $100+ billion of
government incentives in building Chinese fabs, while simultaneously trying
to create indigenous supplies of wafer fab equipment and electronic design
automation software
* Over the last few decades the U.S. moved most of its fabs to Asia. Today we
are incentivizing bringing fabs and chip production back to the U.S.
An industry that previously was only of interest to technologists is now one of
the largest pieces in great power competition.
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SAVE THE DATE! THE 5TH LEAN INNOVATION EDUCATORS SUMMIT
Posted on January 19, 2022 by steve blank
SAVE THE DATE for the 5th Lean Innovation Educators Summit on The Role of
Educators and the University in Building Sustainable and Innovative Ecosystems
February 3rd, 2022 from 1 to 4pm EST, 10 to 1pm PST
Join me, Jerry Engel, Pete Newell, and Steve Weinstein as well as educators from
universities around the world for this upcoming event.
The Summit brings together leading entrepreneurship educators who are putting
Lean Innovation to work in their classrooms, accelerators, and students’
ventures. This is the fifth edition of this semi-annual gathering, a supportive
peer community of educators, and we’ll meet to discuss how we adapt to meet the
challenges of the current tumultuous environment. The upcoming session will
focus on the role of the university, and other important organizations in our
ecosystems, in supporting our critical mission of preparing the next generation
of entrepreneurs and innovators.
Why?
The role of entrepreneurs and the ecosystem that supports them is even more
important as the pace of change accelerates. The challenges of the pandemic and
global warming highlight the importance of capturing value from technology and
the innovators who create novel and effective solutions. How do we
as entrepreneurship and innovation educators best prepare the next generation?
What is the role of the university in helping us do this?
What?
Our key note speaker is Dr. Richard Lyons of UC Berkeley – the University’s
first ever Chief Innovation Officer. After ten years as Dean of the Berkeley
Haas School of Business, Rich brings a fresh and broad perspective. Stimulated
by Professor Lyon’s keynote, we’ll get to the heart of the Summit, our peer to
peer discussions. In these moderated sessions we’ll discuss best practices with
colleagues from around the world. We’ll then share the results of the breakout
sessions with everyone.
How?
This session is free but limited to Innovation educators. You can register for
the event here and learn more on our website:
https://www.commonmission.us/summit. We look forward to gathering as
a community to continue shaping the future of Lean Innovation Education.
Panelists and moderators include:
Ivy Schultz – Columbia University
Victoria Larke – University of Toronto
Ali Hawks – BMNT
Julie Collins – Georgia Tech
Babu DasGupta – University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee
Bob Dorf – Columbia University
Michael Marasco – Northwestern University
Sabra Horne – BMNT
Phil Weilerstein – Venture Well
Tyrome Smith – Common Mission Project
Thomas O’Neal – University of Central Florida
Paul Fox – La Salle University
Philip Bouchard – TrustedPeer Entrepreneurship
Jim Hornthal – UC Berkeley
Todd Morrill – UC Berkeley
Todd Basche – BMNT
Dave Chapman – University College London
Stephanie Marrus – University of California – San Francisco
Sid Saleh – Colorado School of Mines
Joe Smith – Department of Defense
Jim Chung – George Washington University
When?
See you February 3rd, 2022 from 1 to 4pm EST, 10 to 1pm PST.
Register here
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WHAT’S PLAN B? – THE SMALL, THE AGILE, AND THE MANY
Posted on January 18, 2022 by steve blank
This post previously appeared in the Proceedings of the Naval Institute.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the most audacious and bold manifestos for the future of Naval innovation
has just been posted by the Rear Admiral who heads up the Office of Naval
Research. It may be the hedge we need to deter China in the South China Sea.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
While You Were Out
In the two decades since 9/11, while the U.S. was fighting Al-Qaeda and ISIS,
China built new weapons and developed new operational concepts to negate U.S.
military strengths. They’ve built ICBMs with conventional warheads to hit our
aircraft carriers. They converted reefs in international waters into airbases,
creating unsinkable aircraft carriers that extend the range of their aircraft
and are armed with surface to air missiles make it dangerous to approach China’s
mainland and Taiwan.
To evade our own fleet air defense systems, they’ve armed their missiles with
maneuvering warheads, and to reduce our reaction time they have missiles that
travel at hypersonic speed.
The sum of these Chinese offset strategies means that in the South China Sea the
U.S. can no longer deter a war because we can longer guarantee we can win one.
This does not bode well for our treaty allies, Japan, the Philippines, and South
Korea. Control of the South China Sea would allow China to control fishing
operations and oil and gas exploration; to politically coerce other countries
bordering in the region; to enforce an air defense identification zone (ADIZ)
over the South China Sea; or to enforce a blockade around Taiwan or invade it.
What To Do About It?
Today the Navy has aircraft carriers, submarines, surface combatants, aircraft,
and sensors under the sea and in space. Our plan to counter to China can be
summed up as, more of the same but better and more tightly integrated.
This might be the right strategy. However, what if we’re wrong? What if our
assumptions about the survivability of these naval platforms and the ability of
our marines to operate, were based on incorrect assumption about our investments
in material, operational concepts and mental models?
If so, it might be prudent for the Navy to have a hedge strategy. Think of a
hedge as a “just in case” strategy. It turns out the Navy had one in WWII. And
it won the war in the Pacific.
War Plan Orange
In the 1930s U.S. war planners thought about a future war with Japan. The result
was “War Plan Orange” centered on the idea that ultimately, American battleships
would engage the Japanese fleet in a gunnery battle, which the U.S. would win.
Unfortunately for us Japan didn’t adhere to our war plan. They were bolder and
more imaginative than we were. Instead of battleships, they used aircraft
carriers to attack us. The U.S. woke up on Dec. 7, 1941, with most of our
battleships sitting on the bottom of Pearl Harbor. The core precept of War Plan
Orange went to the bottom with it.
But the portfolio of options available to Admiral Nimitz and President Roosevelt
were not limited to battleships. They had a hedge strategy in place in case the
battleships were not the solution. The hedges? Aircraft carriers and submarines.
While the U.S. Navy’s primary investment pre-WW2 was in battleships, the Navy
had also made a substantial alternative investment – in aircraft carriers and
submarines. The Navy launched the first aircraft carrier in 1920. For the next
two decades they ran fleet exercises with them. At the beginning of the war the
U.S. Navy had seven aircraft carriers (CVs) and one aircraft escort vessel
(AVG). By the end of the war the U.S. had built 111 carriers. (24 fleet
carriers, 9 light carriers and 78 escort carriers.) 12 were sunk.
As it turned out, it was carriers, subs, and the Marines who won the Pacific
conflict.
Our Current Plan
Fast forward to today. For the last 80 years the carriers in a Carrier Strike
Group and submarines remain the preeminent formation for U.S. naval warfare.
China has been watching us operate and fight in this formation for decades. But
what if carrier strike groups can no longer win a fight? What if the U.S. is
underestimating China’s capabilities, intents, imagination, and operating
concepts? What if they can disable or destroy our strike groups (via cyber,
conventionally armed ICBMs, cruise missiles, hypersonics, drones, submarines,
etc.)? If that’s a possibility, then what is the Navy’s 21st-century hedge? What
is its Plan B?
Says Who?
Here’s where this conversation gets interesting. While I have an opinion, think
tanks have an opinion, and civilians in the Pentagon have an opinion, RAdm Lorin
Selby, the Chief of the Office of Naval Research (ONR), has more than just “an
opinion.” ONR is the Navy’s science and technology systems command. Its job is
to see over the horizon and think about what’s possible. Selby was previously
deputy commander of the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and commander of the
Naval Surface Warfare Centers (NSWC). As the chief engineer of the Navy, he was
the master of engineering the large and the complex.
What follows is my paraphrasing RADM Selby’s thinking about a hedge strategy the
Navy needs and how they should get there.
Diversification
A hedge strategy is built on the premise that you invest in different things,
not more or better versions of the same.
If you look at the Navy force structure today and its plan for the next decade,
at first glance you might say they have a diversified portfolio and a plan for
more. The Navy has aircraft carriers, submarines, surface combatants, and many
types of aircraft. And they plan for a distributed fleet architecture, including
321 to 372 manned ships and 77 to 140 large, unmanned vehicles.
But there is an equally accurate statement that this is not a diversified
portfolio because all these assets share many of the same characteristics:
* They are all large compared to their predecessors
* They are all expensive – to the point where the Navy can’t afford the number
of platforms our force structure assessments suggest they need
* They are all multi-mission and therefore complex
* The system-to-system interactions to create these complex integrations drive
up cost and manufacturing lead times
* Long manufacturing lead times mean they have no surge capacity
* They are acquired on a requirements model that lags operational
identification of need by years…sometimes decades when you fold in the
construction span times for some of these complex capabilities like carriers
or submarines
* They are difficult to modernize – The ability to update the systems aboard
these platforms, even the software systems, still takes years to accomplish
If the primary asset of the U.S. fleet now and in the future is the large and
the complex, then surely there must be a hedge, a Plan B somewhere? (Like the
pre-WW2 aircraft carriers.) In fact, there isn’t. The Navy has demos of
alternatives, but there is no force structure built on a different set of
principles that would complicate China’s plans and create doubt in our
adversaries of whether they could prevail in a conflict.
The Hedge Strategy – Create “the small, the agile, and the many”
In a world where the large and the complex are either too expensive to generate
en masse or potentially too vulnerable to put at risk, “the small, the agile,
and the many” has the potential to define the future of Navy formations.
We need formations composed of dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of unmanned
vehicles above, below, and on the ocean surface. We need to build collaborating,
autonomous formations…NOT a collection of platforms.
This novel formation is going to be highly dependent on artificial intelligence
and new software that enables cross-platform collaboration and human machine
teaming.
To do this we need a different world view. One that is no longer tied to large
20th-century industrial systems, but to a 21st-century software-centric agile
world.
The Selby Manifesto:
* Digitally adept naval forces will outcompete forces organized around
principle of industrial optimization. “Data is the new oil and software is
the new steel”
* The systems engineering process we have built over the last 150 years is not
optimal for software-based systems.
* Instead, iterative design approaches dominate software design
* The Navy has world-class engineering and acquisition processes to deal with
hardware
* but applying the same process and principles to digital systems is a
mistake
* The design principles that drive software companies are fundamentally
different than those that drive industrial organizations.
* Applying industrial-era principles to digital era technologies is a recipe
for failure
* The Navy has access to amazing capabilities that already exist. And part of
our challenge will be to integrate those capabilities together in novel ways
that allow new modes of operation and more effectiveness against
operational priorities
* There’s an absolute need to foster a collaborative partnership with
academia and businesses – big businesses, small businesses, and startups
* This has serious implication of how the Navy and Marine Corps needs to
change. What do we need to change when it comes to engineering and operating
concepts?
How To Get “The Small, The Agile, and The Many” Tested and In The Water?
Today, “the small, the agile and the many” have been run in war games,
exercises, simulations, and small demonstrations, but not built at scale in a
formation of dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of unmanned vehicles above,
below and on the ocean’s surface. We need to prove whether these systems can
fight alongside our existing assets (or independently if required).
ONR plans to rapidly prove that this idea works, and that the Navy can build it.
Or they will disprove the theory. Either way the Navy needs to know quickly
whether they have a hedge. Time is not on our side in the South China Sea.
ONR’s plan is to move boldly. They’re building this new “small, the agile, and
the many”formation on digital principles and they’re training a new class of
program managers – digital leaders – to guide the journey through the complex
software and data.
They are going to partner with industry using rapid, simple, and accountable
acquisition processes, using it to get through the gauntlet of discussions to
contract in short time periods so we can get to work. And these processes are
going to excite new partners and allies.
They’re going to use all the ideas already on the shelves, whether government
shelves or commercial shelves, and focus on what can be integrated and then what
must be invented.
All the while they’ve been talking to commanders in fleets around the world. And
taking a page from digital engineering practices, instead of generating a list
of requirements, they’re building to the operational need by asking “what is the
real problem?” They are actively listening, using Lean and design thinking to
hear and understand the problems, to build a minimal viable product – a
prototype solution – and get it into the water. Then asking, did that solve the
problem…no? Why not? Okay, we are going to go fix it and come back in a few
months, not years.
The goal is to demonstrate this novel naval formation virtually, digitally,
and then physically with feedback from in water experiments. Ultimately the goal
is getting agile prototyping out to sea and doing it faster than ever before.
In the end the goal is to effectively evaluate the idea of “the small, the
agile, and the many.” How to iterate at scale and at speed. How to take things
that meet operational needs and make them part of the force structure, deploying
them in novel naval formations, learning their operational capabilities, not
just their technical merits. If we’re successful, then we can help guarantee the
rest of century.
What Can Go Wrong?
During the Cold War the U.S. prided itself on developing offset strategies,
technical or operational concepts that leapfrogged the Soviet Union. Today China
has done that to us. They’ve surprised us with multiple offset strategies, and
more are likely to come. The fact is that China is innovating faster than the
Department of Defense, they’ve gotten inside our DoD OODA loop.
But China is not innovating faster than our nation as a whole. Innovation in our
commercial ecosystem — in AI, machine learning, autonomy, commercial access to
space, cyber, biotech, semiconductors (all technologies the DoD and Navy need) —
continues to solve the toughest problems at speed and scale, attracting the best
and the brightest with private capital that dwarfs the entire DoD R&E (research
and engineering) budget.
RADM Selby’s plan of testing the hedge of “the small, the agile, and the many”
using tools and technologies of the 21st century is exactly the right direction
for the Navy.
However, in peacetime bold, radical ideas are not welcomed. They disrupt the
status quo. They challenge existing reporting structures, and in a world of
finite budgets, money has to be taken from existing programs and primes or
programs even have to be killed to make the new happen. Even when positioned as
a hedge, existing vendors, existing Navy and DoD organizations, existing
political power centers, will all see “the small, the agile, and the many” as a
threat. It challenges careers, dollars, and mindsets. Many will do their best to
impede, kill or co-opt this idea.
We are outmatched in the South China Sea. And the odds are getting longer each
year. In a war with China we won’t have years to rebuild our Navy.
A crisis is an opportunity to clear out the old to make way for the new. If
senior leadership of the Navy, DoD, executive branch, and Congress truly believe
we need to win this fight, that this is a crisis, then ONR and “the small, the
agile, and the many” needs a direct report to the Secretary of the Navy and the
budget and authority to make this happen.
The Navy and the country need a hedge. Let’s get started now.
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TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION, AND GREAT POWER COMPETITION – WRAP UP
Posted on January 11, 2022 by steve blank
This article first appeared in West Point’s Modern War Institute.
We just had our final session of our Technology, Innovation, and Great Power
Competition class. Joe Felter, Raj Shah and I designed the class to give our
students insights on how commercial technology (AI, machine learning, autonomy,
cyber, quantum, semiconductors, access to space, biotech, hypersonics, and
others) will shape how we employ all the elements of national power (our
influence and footprint on the world stage).
(Catch up with the class by reading our intro to the class, and summaries
of Classes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 6, 7 and 8.)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This class has four parts that were like most lecture classes in international
policy:
* Weekly Readings – 5-10 articles/week
* 20+ guest speakers on technology and its impact on national power – prior
secretaries of defense and state, current and prior National Security council
members, four-star generals who lead service branches
* Lectures/Class discussion
* Midterm individual project – a 2,000-word policy memo that describes how a
U.S. competitor is using a specific technology to counter U.S. interests and
a proposal how the U.S. should respond
The fifth part of the class was unique.
* A quarter-long, team-based final project. Students developed hypotheses of
how commercial technologies can be used in new and creative ways to help the
U.S. wield its instruments of national power. And then they got out of the
classroom and interviewed 20+ beneficiaries, policy makers, and other key
stakeholders testing their hypotheses and proposed solutions.
At the end of the quarter, each of the teams gave a final “Lessons Learned”
presentation with a follow-up a 3,000 to 5,000-word team-written paper.
By the end the class all the teams realized that the problem they had selected
had morphed into something bigger, deeper and much more interesting.
TEAM ARMY VENTURE CAPITAL
Original problem statement: the U.S. needs to reevaluate and improve its public
venture capital relationship with companies with dual-use technologies.
Final problem statement: the DoD needs to reevaluate and improve its funding
strategies and partnerships with dual-use mid-stage private companies.
If you can’t see the presentation click here.
We knew that these students could write a great research paper. As we pointed
out to them, while you can be the smartest person in the building, it’s unlikely
that 1) all the facts are in the building, 2) you’re smarter than the collective
intelligence sitting outside the building.
TEAM CONFLICTED CAPITAL
Original problem statement: Chinese investment in US startups with critical
technologies poses a threat to US military capabilities, but the lack of
transparency in venture capital makes it challenging to track them.
Final problem statement: Chinese adversarial venture capital investments in U.S.
dual-use startups continue to threaten US military capabilities across critical
technologies, but the scope of the problem is relatively small. VCs and
entrepreneurs can play a role in addressing the challenge by shunning known
sources of adversarial capital.
If you can’t see the presentation click here.
By week 2 of the class students formed teams around a specific technology
challenge facing a US government agency and worked throughout the course to
develop their own proposals to help the U.S. compete more effectively through
new operational concepts, organizations, and/or strategies.
TEAM AURORA
Original Problem Statement: How can the U.S. employ its cyber capabilities to
provide the populace of China with unrestricted Internet access to bolster civil
society against CCP crackdowns, in order to pressure the PRC, spread American
liberal values, and uphold U.S. freedom of action in the information domain?
Final Problem Statement: How does the USG leverage a soft-power information
campaign to support Hong Kong residents’ right to self-determination and
democratic governance without placing individuals at undue risk (of prosecution
as foreign agents under the National Security Law)?
If you can’t see the presentation click here.
We wanted to give our students hands-on experience on how to deeply understand a
problem at the intersection of our country’s diplomacy, information, its
military capabilities, economic strength, finance, intelligence, and law
enforcement and dual-use technology. First by having them develop hypotheses
about the problem; next by getting out of the classroom and talking to relevant
stakeholders across government, industry, and academia to validate their
assumptions; and finally by taking what they learned to propose and
prototype solutions to these problems.
TEAM SHORTCIRCUIT
Original Problem Statement: U.S. semiconductor procurement is heavily dependent
on TSMC, which creates a substantial vulnerability in the event a PRC invasion
of Taiwan, or other kinetic disruptions in the Indo-Pacific.
Final Problem Statement: How should the U.S. Government augment the domestic
semiconductor workforce through education and innovation initiatives to increase
its semiconductor sector competitiveness?
If you can’t see the presentation click here.
We want our students to build the reflexes and skills to deeply understand a
problem by gathering first-hand information and validating that the problem they
are solving is the real problem, not a symptom of something else. Then, students
began rapidly building minimal viable solutions (policy, software, hardware …)
as a way to test and validate their understanding of both the problem and what
it would take to solve it.
TEAM DRONE
Original Problem Statement: Drones can be used as a surprise element in an
amphibious assault to overwhelm defenses. In a potential Taiwan Strait Crisis,
there is a need for a low-cost and survivable counter-drone system to defend
Taiwan.
Final Problem Statement: Taiwan needs a robust and survivable command and
control system to effectively and quickly bring the right asset to the right
place at the right time during an invasion.
If you can’t see the presentation click here.
One other goal of the class was testing a teaching team hypothesis – that we
could turn a lecture class into one that gave back more in output than we put
in. That by tasking the students to 1) use what they learned from the lectures
and 2) then test their assumptions outside the classroom, the external input
they received would be a force multiplier. It would make the lecture material
real, tangible and actionable. And we and they would end up with something quite
valuable.
TEAM APOLLO
Original Problem Statement: The Space Force must leverage commercial innovation
and establish a trained, experienced acquisition workforce that will deliver
innovation impact that the Space Force requires.
Final Problem Statement: The United States Space Force lacks the supply chain
and rapid launch capabilities needed to respond to contingencies in space. The
private sector possesses these capabilities, but is not being adequately
leveraged or incentivized.
If you can’t see the presentation click here.
We knew we were asking a lot from our students. We were integrating a lecture
class with a heavy reading list with the best practices of hypothesis testing
from Lean Launchpad/Hacking for Defense/I-Corps. But I’ve yet to bet wrong in
pushing students past what they think is reasonable. Most rise way above the
occasion.
Given this was the first time we taught integrated lectures and projects our
student reviews ranged from the “we must have paid them to write this” to “did
they take the same class as everyone else?” (Actually it was, let’s fix the
valid issues they raised.)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A few student quotes:
“This is a MUST TAKE [caps theirs]. The professors and teaching team are second
to none, and the guest speakers are truly amazing. This course is challenging,
but you truly get out of it what you put into it, and you will learn so much
crucial and interesting material.”
“THIS IS A FANTASTIC COURSE! [caps theirs]. The material was excellent, the
instruction from legendary professions was top notch and the reading material
was timely, interesting, and relevant. Anyone who is interested in geopolitics
and technology innovation needs to take this course. Not only that, but each
week features a different guest speaker that is usually from the highest levels
of US government and is THE expert in the subject for that week’s course. Really
amazing experience getting to listen to and have Q&A with such incredible
people.”
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TEAM CATENA
Original Problem Statement: China’s cryptocurrency ban presents the U.S. with an
opportunity to influence blockchain development, attract technical talent, and
leverage digital asset technology.
Final Problem Statement: CCP’s economic coercion makes countries such as
Australia dependent on China’s economy and vulnerable to the party’s will. The
U.S. must analyze which key Australian industries are most threatened and
determine viable alternative trading partners.
If you can’t see the presentation click here.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A few more student quotes:
“This is hands-down one of the best courses I’ve taken at Stanford. From the
moment I walked into the door, I was stunned by both the caliber of people
you’re sharing oxygen with in that room, and how welcoming and accessible they
are. Despite it being the first offering of this course, everything was
well-organized, and our team was always supported with a wealth of resources and
access we needed to get our policy deliverables to, alongside a healthy dose of
near-constant feedback and encouragement from the teaching team. Readings were
engaging and insightful, and the guest list we had was simply unbelievable-
Mattis, McFaul, Rice, Pottinger, among several others in the White House,
Pentagon, and beyond. There’s a real feeling that everyone who worked on this
course wants you to grow as a student but also teach them what you’re learning.
Beware Steve Blank- he can be harsh and aggressive but exemplifies the ‘rude but
life-saving doctor’ trope. I’ve learned more from responding to a single Blank
cold-question in lecture than from three entire quarters of applied math at
Stanford. Be sure to get started early on your teamwork and talk to the
lecturers as much as you can- this really is a ‘you get as much as you give’
course, and the highest returns are to be had by being tenacious, loud, and
unabashed in your questioning.
And, for God’s sake, don’t draw cartoons on your final presentation- the JCOS
might be watching.
“DO NOT TAKE THIS COURSE! This class is a complete waste of time.“
“This was the worst class I took at Stanford “
While the positive feedback accolades for the class were rewarding, several
comments identified areas we can improve:
* Letting the students know upfront the workload and unique format of the class
* Better organization and timing
* Readings: be much clearer on which ones are mandatory vs optional
* Clarify details, flows and objectives for each class
* Tie speakers to projects / student presentations
* Make weekly office hours mandatory to ensure all students receive regular
professor/student interaction, feedback and guidance from week 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All of our students put in extraordinary amount of work. Our students, a mix
between international policy and engineering, will go off to senior roles in
State, Defense, policy and to the companies building new disruptive
technologies. They will be the ones to determine what the world-order will look
like for the rest of the century and beyond. Will it be a rules-based order
where states cooperate to pursue a shared vision for a free and open region and
where the sovereignty of all countries large and small is protected under
international law? Or will it be an autocratic and dystopian future coerced and
imposed by a neo-totalitarian regime?
This class changed the trajectory of many of our students. A number expressed
newfound interest in exploring career options in the field of national security.
Several will be taking advantage of opportunities provided by the Gordian Knot
Center for National Security Innovation to further pursue their contribution to
national security.
LESSONS LEARNED
> * We could turn a lecture class into one that gave back more in output than
> we put in.
> * Tasking the students to test their assumptions outside the classroom, the
> external input they received was a force multiplier
> * It made the lecture material real, tangible and actionable
> * Pushing students past what they think is reasonable results in
> extraordinary output. Most rise way above the occasion
> * The output of the class convinced us that the work of students like these
> could materially add to the safety and security of the free world
> * It is a national security imperative to create greater opportunities for
> our best and brightest to engage and address challenges at the nexus of
> technology, innovation and national security
>
> Note: Inspired by our experience with this course, we decided to increase the
> focus of Stanford’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation on
> developing and empowering the extraordinary and largely untapped potential of
> students across the university and beyond.
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YEAR END REVIEW – WHAT YOU MIGHT HAVE MISSED
Posted on December 30, 2021 by steve blank
“IT WAS THE BEST OF TIMES, IT WAS THE WORST OF TIMES, IT WAS THE AGE OF WISDOM,
IT WAS THE AGE OF FOOLISHNESS, IT WAS THE EPOCH OF BELIEF, IT WAS THE EPOCH OF
INCREDULITY, IT WAS THE SEASON OF LIGHT, IT WAS THE SEASON OF DARKNESS, IT WAS
THE SPRING OF HOPE, IT WAS THE WINTER OF DESPAIR.”
Charles Dickens
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
What a year for all us. The quote above sums it up for me.
I thought I’d share an end of year summary of the best of the 2021 posts.
Enjoy.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
INNOVATION IN LARGE ORGANIZATIONS
* The difference between creating new things versus executing existing ones in
two sentences. Here
* Why innovation heroes are the sign of a dysfunctional organization. The title
says it all. Here.
CULTURE
* Sometimes we get trapped inside our own heads. I know I did. Here’s how to
get unstuck. Here
* We all don’t see the world the same way. And I don’t mean politics. Some of
us literally can’t see what you can. Here.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP
* Why are you waiting for permission to get smarter? You don’t need permission.
Here.
* Ever wonder how a class you took gets designed? There’s a lot under the hood.
Here’s how.
NATIONAL SECURITY
* U.S. national security problems are multiplying faster than our traditional
institutions can solve. So we decided to create something different – The
Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation. Here.
Happy Holidays.
On to a better year.
steve
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I CAN’T SEE YOU BUT I’M NOT BLIND
Posted on December 14, 2021 by steve blank
If I ask you to think of an elephant do you see an elephant in your head when
you close your eyes?
I don’t. Regardless of how descriptive the imagery, story or text I can’t create
any pictures in my head at all. 2% of people can’t do this either. This
inability to visualize is called aphantasia.
I never knew this absence of mental imagery was even a thing until my daughter
pointed out that she and I were missing something my wife and other daughter
had. Ask us to visualize a rainbow or a sunset and we just see nothing. We can’t
create pictures in our head of objects, people, places or experiences. Where
others can visualize these things, we can’t. Not for people, memories, or images
past or future. When people say visualize this in your mind’s eye I just thought
that was a turn of phrase. It now dawns on me that other people were really
seeing something in their heads.
If you want to see what aphantasia is like look at the picture of the Apple. Now
close your eyes and try to imagine the apple, seeing it mentally in your mind’s
eye. If you don’t see anything, you might have aphantasia.
For a more detailed test check out the Vividness of Visual Imagery
Questionnaire.
(I’m also realizing that that when people describe that they can hear the sound
of their voice in their head (a train of thought), that it wasn’t just a
metaphor. But my thoughts are silent.)
My reaction to learning that most people can create visual images was “huh.” I
lived my entire life thinking the word “visualize” meant “think about what this
means,” not actually being able to “see” it. Reading that other people actually
see images in their head was like learning there was another sense that most
people had that I was missing. I was bemused that I had lived my whole life with
the equivalent of seeing the world in black and white and finding out that other
people see the world in colors. (The one exception to this is that I often
wakeup remembering visual images from my dreams.)
Handicap or Asset?
My inability to visualize doesn’t seem to have handicapped my imagination or
creativity. I am constantly thinking about new things – I just don’t see them as
pictures (or hear them.)
I’m not sure what it is I can’t do that others can. Perhaps I can blame my
failure in sports on it? Or my inability to sing or dance? It likely explains
why when my wife asks me what someone was wearing or what their house looked
like, I come up empty. Or more telling, why I can’t visualize the descriptive
language in poetry or in a novel.
What’s interesting is that lacking what most everyone else seems to be able to
do may explain how I think, communicate and process information. Perhaps this
explains how I go about the creative process. When I want to describe an event
that happened, I don’t bring up the visual imagery of what the places or people
looked like. Instead my stories are of what I remember about the
facts/data/conversations around the event.
It might also explain why pattern recognition and abstract thought (the ability
to think about principles, and ideas that are not physically present) come
easier to me. Possibly because I’m not distracted by visual pictures associated
with the data that others see. I just see raw data.
To work out complicated ideas, I often diagram ideas and concepts (but don’t
draw pictures of things.) I break ideas and concepts down into simpler steps by
drawing each part. This helps me simplify ideas so I can first explain it to
myself and then to others. I then translate the diagram into words.
At times the result has been transformative for more than just me.
The way I’m wired has given me (and likely other founders and those in other
fields) an edge. So, how can others with aphantasia consciously harness that?
And for those who do see pictures in your heads is there anything you can learn
from those of us who don’t?
(I wonder if I could have benefited from a modified classroom curriculum if this
had been discovered this early. Or if I could have been taught how to visualize.
But what would have been have lost?)
Pluses and Minuses
When I first heard about aphantasia I wondered if those of us with it would tend
to excel in certain fields and avoid others. I was surprised to find out that
someone already ran a study that showed that people with low or no visual
imagery are more likely to work in scientific and mathematical industries. And
having hyperphantasia (people with the opposite condition – having an extremely
vivid mental imagery) predisposes people to work in the arts. It makes me wonder
if the response and recovery from trauma/PTSD has some correlation with those
with the ability to visualize those memories versus those who don’t. (Here’s a
great future study area for the Veterans Administration.)
We’re Just at the Beginning of Understanding
This latest recognition of aphantasia as a neurological difference is only a
decade or so old (although references in the literature go back to the 1890’s.)
My bet is that as science continues to explore neurodiversity (brain differences
among people), we’ll gain a wider understanding that people experience, interact
with, and interpret the world in many different ways. And how that leads to
different strengths in comprehension, pattern recognition and
problem-solving. We’ll likely discover more connections.
I’m curious if there’s anyone else who can’t see pictures in their head.
Let me know.
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THE GORDIAN KNOT CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY INNOVATION AT STANFORD
Posted on November 30, 2021 by steve blank
penitus cogitare, cito agere – think deeply, act quickly
75 years ago, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) helped kickstart innovation in
Silicon Valley with a series of grants to Fred Terman, Dean of Stanford’s
Engineering school. Terman used the money to set up the Stanford Electronics
Research Lab. He staffed it with his lab managers who built the first electronic
warfare and electronic intelligence systems in WWII. This lab pushed the
envelope of basic and applied research in microwave devices and electronics and
within a few short years made Stanford a leader in these fields. The lab became
ground zero for the wave of Stanford’s entrepreneurship and innovation in the
1950’s and 60’s and helped form what would later be called Silicon Valley.
75 years later, ONR just laid down a bet again, one we believe will be equally
transformative. They’re the first sponsors of the new Gordian Knot Center for
National Security Innovation at Stanford that Joe Felter, Raj Shah, and I have
started.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GORDIAN WHAT?
A Gordian Knot is a metaphor for an intractable problem. Today, the United
States is facing several seemingly intractable national security problems
simultaneously.
We intend to help solve them in Stanford’s Gordian Knot Center for National
Security Innovation. Our motto of penitus cogitare, cito agere, think deeply,
act quickly, embraces our unique intersection of deep problem understanding,
combined with rapid solutions. The Center combines six unique strengths of
Stanford and its location in Silicon Valley.
1. The insights and expertise of Stanford international and national security
policy leaders
2. The technology insights and expertise of Stanford Engineering
3. Exceptional students willing to help the country win the Great Power
Competition
4. Silicon Valley’s deep technology ecosystem
5. Our experience in rapid problem understanding, rapid iteration and
deployment of solutions with speed and urgency
6. Access to risk capital at scale
Our focus will match our motto. We’re going to coordinate resources at Stanford
and peer universities, and across Silicon Valley’s innovation ecosystem to:
* Scale national security innovation education
* Train national security innovators
* Offer insight, integration, and policy outreach
* Provide a continual output of minimal viable products that can act as
catalysts for solutions to the toughest problems
WHY NOW? WHY US?
Over the last decade we’ve created a series of classes in entrepreneurship,
rapid innovation, and national security: Lean LaunchPad; National Science
Foundation I-Corps; Hacking for Defense; Hacking for Diplomacy; Technology,
Innovation and Modern War last year; and this year Technology, Innovation and
Great Power Competition. These classes have been widely adopted, across the U.S.
and globally.
Simultaneously, each of us was actively engaged in helping different branches of
the government understand, react, and deliver solutions in a rapidly changing
and challenging environment. It’s become clear to us that for the first time in
three decades, the U.S. is now engaged in a Great Power Competition. And we’re
behind. Our national power (our influence and footprint on the world stage) is
being challenged and effectively negated by autocratic regimes like China and
Russia.
GKC JOINS A SELECT GROUP OF NATIONAL SECURITY THINK TANKS
At Stanford, the Gordian Knot Center will sit in the Freeman Spogli Institute
for International Studies run by Mike McFaul, ex ambassador to Russia. And Mike
has graciously agreed to be our Principal Investigator along with Riitta Katila
in the Management Science and Engineering Department (MS&E) in the Engineering
School. MS&E is where disruptive technology meets national security, and has a
long history of brilliant contributions from Bill Perry, Sig Hecker and
Elisabeth Pate-Cornell and others. (Stanford’s other policy institute is the
Hoover Institution, run by Condoleezza Rice, ex secretary of state). All are
world-class leaders in understanding international problems, policies, and
institutions. Other U.S. foreign affairs and national security think tanks
include:
* Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
* RAND Corporation
* Brookings Institution
* Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
* Atlantic Council
* Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
* Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
* Heritage Foundation
We intend to focus the new Center on solving problems across the spectrum of
activities that create and sustain national power. National power is the
combination of a country’s diplomacy (soft power and alliances), information,
military and economic strength as well as its finance, intelligence, and law
enforcement – or DIME-FIL. Our projects will be those at the intersection of
DIME-FIL with the onslaught of commercial technologies (AI, machine learning,
autonomy, biotech, cyber, semiconductors, commercial access to space, et al.).
And we’re going to hit the ground running by moving our two national security
classes — Hacking for Defense, and Technology Innovation and Great Power
Competition (which this year is now a required course in the International
Policy program) — into the Center.
We hope our unique charter, “think deeply, act quickly” can complement the
extraordinary work these other institutions provide.
THE OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH (ONR)
The Office of Naval Research (ONR) has been planning, fostering, and encouraging
scientific research—and reimagining naval power—since 1946. The grants it made
to Stanford that year were the first to any university.
Today, the Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps is looking to find ways to accelerate
technology development and delivery to our naval forces. There is broad
consensus that the current pace of technology development and adoption is
unsatisfactory, and that without significant reform, we will lose the
competition with China in the South China Sea for maritime superiority.
Rear Admiral Selby, Chief of Naval Research, has recognized that it’s no longer
“business as usual.” That ONR delivering sustaining innovations for the existing
fleet and marine forces is no longer good enough to deter war or keep us in the
fight. And that ONR once again needs to lead with disruptive technologies, new
operational concepts, new types of program management and mindsets. He’s on a
mission to provide the Navy and U.S. Marine Corps with just that. When we
approached him about the idea of the Gordian Knot Center he reminded us, that
not only did ONR sponsor Stanford in 1946, they’ve been sponsoring our Hacking
for Defense class since 2016! Now they’ve become our charter sponsor for the
Gordian Knot Center.
We hope to earn it – for him, ONR, and the country.
Steve, Joe and Raj
LESSONS LEARNED
> The Center combines six unique strengths of Stanford and its location in
> Silicon Valley
>
> * The insights and expertise of Stanford international and national security
> policy leaders
> * The technology insights and expertise of Stanford Engineering
> * Exceptional students willing to help the country win the Great Power
> Competition
> * Silicon Valley’s deep technology ecosystem
> * Our experience in rapid problem understanding, rapid iteration and
> deployment of solutions with speed and urgency
> * Access to risk capital at scale
>
> Our focus will match our motto. We’re going to coordinate resources at
> Stanford and peer universities and across Silicon Valley’s innovation
> ecosystem to:
>
> * Scale national security innovation education
> * Train national security innovators
> * Offer insight, integration, and policy outreach
> * Provide a continual output of minimal viable products that can act as
> catalysts for solutions to the toughest problems
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TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION, AND GREAT POWER COMPETITION – CLASS 8 – CYBER
Posted on November 26, 2021 by steve blank
This article first appeared in West Point’s Modern War Institute.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
We just completed the eighth week of our new national security class at Stanford
– Technology, Innovation and Great Power Competition. Joe Felter, Raj Shah and I
designed the class to cover how technology will shape the character and
employment of all instruments of national power.
In class 1, we learned that national power is the sum of all the resources
available to a state to pursue its national objectives and interests. This power
is wielded through a combination of a country’s diplomacy, information, its
military capabilities, economic strength, finance, intelligence, and law
enforcement. These instruments of national power employed in a “whole of
government approach” to advance a state’s interests are known by the
acronym DIME-FIL.
Class 2 focused on China, the U.S.’s primary great power competitor. China is
using all elements of its national power, e.g. information/ intelligence, its
military might and economic strength as well as exploiting Western finance and
technology. China’s goal is to challenge and overturn the U.S.-led liberal
international order and replace it with its own neo-totalitarian model where
China emerges as the dominant regional and global power.
The third class focused on Russia, which since 2014 has asserted itself as a
competing great power. We learned how Russia pursues security and economic
interests in parallel with its ideological aims.
The fourth class shifted our focus to the impact commercial technologies have on
the instruments of national power (DIME-FIL). The first technology we examined
was semiconductors, and the U.S. dependence on TSMC in Taiwan, for its most
advanced logic chips. This is problematic as China claims Taiwan is a province
of China.
In the fifth class we examined the impact that AI and Machine Learning will
continue to have on the capabilities and employment of DIME-FIL. We heard from
the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC), the focal point of the DOD AI
strategy; and from the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) – a DoD organization that
contracts with commercial companies to solve national security problems.
In class six we discussed unmanned systems and autonomy and how the advent of
these weapons will change operational concepts and the face of war.
Class seven looked at the Second Space Age, how our military and civilian
economy rely on assets in space, and how space is now a contested environment,
with China and Russia capable of disabling/destroying our satellites
Today’s class: Cyber
Catch up with the class by reading our intro to the class, and summaries
of Classes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 6 and 7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
REQUIRED READINGS
Case Study for Class
* Suraj Srinivasan, et al., “Data Breach at Equifax” Harvard Business School,
Apr. 25, 2019.
Competition in Cyber Space
* Michael Warner, “US Cyber Command’s First Decade” Hoover
* Paul M. Nakasone & Michael Sulmeyer, “How to Compete in Cyberspace: Cyber
Command’s New Approach” Foreign Affairs, Aug. 25, 2020.
* Mark Grzegorzewski & Christopher Marsh, “Incorporating the Cyberspace Domain:
How Russia and China Exploit Asymmetric Advantages in Great Power
Competition” Modern War Institute, Mar. 15, 2021.
Cyber Attacks / Cyber Warfare
* Kim Zetter, “An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First Digital
Weapon” WIRED, Nov. 03, 2014.
* Andy Greenberg, “How an Entire Nation Became Russia’s Test Lab for Cyberwar”
WIRED, June 20, 2017.
IP & Protected Personal Information Theft
* Garrett M. Graff, “China’s Hacking Spree Will Have a Decades-Long Fallout”
WIRED, Feb. 11, 2020.
* “Update to the IP Commission Report: The Theft of American Intellectual
Property: Reassessments of the Challenge and United States Policy” The
Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, 2017.
Political Interference
* Andy Greenberg, “Everything We Know About Russia’s Election-Hacking Playbook”
WIRED, June 09, 2017.
* Gregory Winger, “China’s Disinformation Campaign in the Philippines” The
Diplomat, Oct. 06, 2020.
READING ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONS
Pick one of the below questions and answer in approximately 100 words, based on
the required readings. Please note that this assignment will be graded and count
towards course participation.
1. What is the U.S. Cyber Command’s doctrinal approach to competing in the
cyber domain? Do you agree with the current doctrine? Why or why not? Would
you do anything differently?
2. Of the different types of cyber threats presented in this week’s readings
(cyberattacks, PPI and IP theft, and political interference), which do you
think presents the greatest threat to U.S. interests and why? What should
the U.S do to address that threat? Be specific if your recommendations are
for the government or private sector.
CLASS 8 – GUEST SPEAKER
Dr. Michael Sulmeyer is a Senior Adviser, USCYBERCOM (Cyber Command). He was the
former Senior Director for Cyber at the National Security Council. The former
Cyber Project Director at the Harvard Kennedy School-Belfer Center. He was a
past Director, Plans and Operations, for Cyber Policy in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. Previously, he worked on arms control and the maintenance
of strategic stability between the United States, Russia, and China.
Cyber Command formed in 2010 and is one of the eleven unified combatant commands
of the United States Department of Defense. It’s commanded by a four-star
general, General Paul Nakasone who is also the director of the National Security
Agency and chief of the Central Security Service. It has three main missions:
(1) defending the DoD information systems, (2) supporting joint force commanders
with cyberspace operations, and (3) defending the nation from significant
cyberattacks.
Dr. Sulmeyer has written, “A focus on cyber-deterrence is understandable but
misplaced. Deterrence aims to change the calculations of adversaries by
persuading them that the risks of an attack outweigh the rewards or that they
will be denied the benefits they seek. But in seeking merely to deter enemies,
the United States finds itself constantly on the back foot. Instead, the United
States should be pursuing a more active cyberpolicy, one aimed not at deterring
enemies but at disrupting their capabilities. In cyberwarfare, Washington should
recognize that the best defense is a good offense.
In countries where technology companies are willing to cooperate with the U.S.
government (or with requests from their own government), a phone call to the
right cloud provider or Internet service provider (ISP) could result in getting
bad actors kicked off the Internet.
U.S. hackers could pursue a campaign of erasing computers at scale, disabling
accounts and credentials used by hackers to attack, and cutting off access to
services so it is harder to compromise innocent systems to conduct their
attacks.”
Our national defense cyber policy has now moved to “persistent engagement.”
Defending forward as close as possible to the origin of adversary activity
extends our reach to expose adversaries’ weaknesses, learn their intentions and
capabilities, and counter attacks close to their origins. Continuous engagement
imposes tactical friction and strategic costs on our adversaries, compelling
them to shift resources to defense and reduce attacks. We will pursue attackers
across networks and systems to render most malicious cyber and cyber-enabled
activity inconsequential while achieving greater freedom of maneuver to counter
and contest dangerous adversary activity before it impairs our national power.
LECTURE 8
If you can’t see the lecture 8 slides click here.
LESSONS LEARNED
> * Cyber Command’s role is to:
> * defend the DoD information systems
> * support joint force commanders with cyberspace operations, and
> * defend the nation from significant cyberattacks
> * Cyber Command has evolved from a reactive, defensive posture to a proactive
> posture called “persistent engagement”
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TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION, AND GREAT POWER COMPETITION – CLASS 7 – SPACE
Posted on November 23, 2021 by steve blank
This article first appeared in West Point’s Modern War Institute.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
We just completed the seventh week of our new national security class at
Stanford – Technology, Innovation and Great Power Competition. Joe Felter, Raj
Shah and I designed the class to cover how technology will shape the character
and employment of all instruments of national power.
In class 1, we learned that national power is the sum of all the resources
available to a state to pursue its national objectives and interests. This power
is wielded through a combination of a country’s diplomacy, information, its
military capabilities, economic strength, finance, intelligence, and law
enforcement. These instruments of national power employed in a “whole of
government approach” to advance a state’s interests are known by the
acronym DIME-FIL.
Class 2 focused on China, the U.S.’s primary great power competitor. China is
using all elements of its national power, e.g. information/ intelligence, its
military might and economic strength as well as exploiting Western finance and
technology. China’s goal is to challenge and overturn the U.S.-led liberal
international order and replace it with its own neo-totalitarian model where
China emerges as the dominant regional and global power.
The third class focused on Russia, which since 2014 has asserted itself as a
competing great power. We learned how Russia pursues security and economic
interests in parallel with its ideological aims.
The fourth class shifted our focus to the impact commercial technologies have on
the instruments of national power (DIME-FIL). The first technology we examined
was semiconductors, and the U.S. dependence on TSMC in Taiwan, for its most
advanced logic chips.
In the fifth class we examined the impact that AI and Machine Learning will
continue to have on the capabilities and employment of DIME-FIL.
In class six we discussed unmanned systems and autonomy and how the advent of
these weapons will change operational concepts and the face of war.
Today’s class: The Second Space Age: Great Power Competition in Space.
Catch up with the class by reading our intro to the class, and summaries
of Classes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
REQUIRED READINGS
The Cold War: Space Race 1.0
* Martand Jha, “This Is How the Space Race Changed the Great Power Rivalry
Forever” The National Interest, July 27, 2017.
* “Space as a Warfighting Domain: Issues for Congress” Congressional Research
Service
* Maddie Davis, “The Space Race” University of Virginia – The Miller Center,
2021.
* “Cold War in Space: Top Secret Reconnaissance Satellites Revealed” National
Museum of the United States Air Force, June 02, 2015.
Space as a Domain
* Lt Gen David “D. T.” Thompson, “Space as a War-Fighting Domain” Air & Space
Power Journal, Summer 2018.
Age of Great Power Competition: Space Race 2.0
* William J. Broad, “How Space Became the Next ‘Great Power’ Contest Between
the U.S. and China” New York Times, Jan. 24, 2021.
* Luke Harding, “The Space Race is Back On—But Who Will Win?” Guardian, July
16, 2021.
* Tim Harford, “The CubeSat Revolution Changing the Way We See the World” BBC
News, July 17, 2019.
* Alexander Bowe, “China’s Pursuit of Space Power Status and Implications for
the United States” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Apr.
11, 2019.
* Greg Autry & Steve Kwast, “America is Losing the Second Space Race to China”
Foreign Policy, Aug. 22, 2019.
America’s Space Forces
* “Defense Primer: The United States Space Force” Congressional Research
Service
* “What’s With All the U.S. Space-Related Agencies” U.S. Department of Defense,
Dec. 14, 2020.
* Bryan Bender, “What the Space Force Is, and Isn’t” Politico, Feb. 03, 2021.
* John W. Raymond, “How We’re Building a 21st-Century Space Force” The
Atlantic, Dec. 20, 2020.
* “United States Space Force” U.S. Department of Defense, Feb. 2019.
* “DOD Space Strategy”, U.S. Department of Defense, 2021.
Space Threats & Non-State Actors
* Harsh Vasani, “How China Is Weaponizing Outer Space” The Diplomat, Jan. 19,
2017.
* Hanneke Weitering, “Russia Has Launched an Anti-Satellite Missile Test, US
Space Command Says” Space.com, Dec. 16, 2020
* Andre Kwok, “The Growing Threat of Cybercrime in the Space Domain” East Asia
Forum, Sept. 9, 2021.
READING ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONS
Pick one of the below questions and answer in approximately 100 words, based on
the required readings.
1. Describe America’s space assets and the role of the U.S. Space Force in
protecting and employing those assets. As the U.S. Space Force continues to
develop, what changes in strategy and/or addition to its portfolio of
responsibilities would you recommend?
2. What is the greatest current threat to U.S. interests in space? What
recommendations would you have for the U.S. and its partners to mitigate
that threat?
CLASS 7 – GUEST SPEAKER
Our guest speaker was General John Raymond, Chief of Space Operations. He is the
first Chief of Space Operations, U.S. Space Force. Space Force has three major
commands — Space Operations Command, Space Systems Command, and Space Training
and Readiness Command.
The Space Force was born as a separate service in December 2019. Previously
General Raymond led re-establishment of U.S. Space Command as 11th U.S.
combatant command, and was for a year the head of both a service (Space Force)
and a combatant command (Space Command).
Raymond said a focus for the Space Force is being lean and fast, innovative and
unified.
Space was once considered “benign,” largely uninhabited except by the United
States and Russia and the Soviet Union. Today it is far more crowded and
dangerous. Raymond pointed out that the ability to operate in space is critical
not only to protect U.S. security, but also to power the U.S. and global
economy, communications, transportation and other essential functions of
everyday life.
“Space is clearly a warfighting domain and we’re convinced that if deterrence
were to fail, we’re going to have to fight and win the battle for space
superiority,” he said.
LECTURE 7
If you can’t see the lecture 7 slides click here.
Next Week: Cyber
LESSONS LEARNED
> * Our military depends on our assets in space (satellites) for communication,
> navigation, situational awareness (via photo, radar and electronic
> intelligence satellites) warning and targeting
> * Our civilian economy also depends on space assets for GPS and communication
> * Space is now a contested environment with China and Russia capable of
> disabling/destroying our satellites
> * Using directed energy (lasers), cyber, electronic warfare, ground or
> space-based kinetic weapons
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