www.fortinet.com Open in urlscan Pro
44.199.160.6  Public Scan

Form analysis
1 forms found in the DOM

GET /blog/search

<form class="b3-searchbox__form" action="/blog/search" method="get">
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FortiGuard Labs Threat Research


EXPLOITING CVE-2024-21412: A STEALER CAMPAIGN UNLEASHED

By Cara Lin | July 23, 2024
 * Article Contents
 * Initial Access
 * Shell Code Injector
 * Final Stealers
 * Conclusion
 * Fortinet Protections
 * IOCs
   IP AddressesHostnamesFiles

By Cara Lin | July 23, 2024

Affected Platforms: Microsoft Windows
Impacted Users: Microsoft Windows
Impact: The stolen information can be used for future attack
Severity Level: High

CVE-2024-21412 is a security bypass vulnerability in Microsoft Windows
SmartScreen that arises from an error in handling maliciously crafted files. A
remote attacker can exploit this flaw to bypass the SmartScreen security warning
dialog and deliver malicious files. Over the past year, several attackers,
including Water Hydra, Lumma Stealer, and Meduza Stealer, have exploited this
vulnerability.

FortiGuard Labs has observed a stealer campaign spreading multiple files that
exploit CVE-2024-21412 to download malicious executable files. Initially,
attackers lure victims into clicking a crafted link to a URL file designed to
download an LNK file. The LNK file then downloads an executable file containing
an HTA script. Once executed, the script decodes and decrypts PowerShell code to
retrieve the final URLs, decoy PDF files, and a malicious shell code injector.
These files aim to inject the final stealer into legitimate processes,
initiating malicious activities and sending the stolen data back to a C2 server.

The threat actors have designed different injectors to evade detection and use
various PDF files to target specific regions, including North America, Spain,
and Thailand. This article elaborates on how these files are constructed and how
the injector works.


Figure 1: Telemetry




Figure 2: Attack chain


INITIAL ACCESS

To start, the attacker constructs a malicious link to a remote server to search
for a URL file with the following content: 



Figure 3: URL files

The target LNK file employs the “forfiles” command to invoke PowerShell, then
executes “mshta” to fetch an execution file from the remote server
“hxxps://21centuryart.com.” 


Figure 4: LNK file

During our investigation, we collected several LNK files that all download
similar executables containing an HTA script embedded within the overlay. This
HTA script has set WINDOWSTATE=”minimize” and SHOWTASKBAR=”no.” It plays a
crucial role in the infection chain by executing additional malicious code and
seamlessly facilitating the next stages of the attack.


Figure 5: HTA script in overlay

After decoding and decrypting the script, a PowerShell code downloads two files
to the “%AppData%” folder. The first is a decoy PDF, a clean file that extracts
the victim’s attention from malicious activity, and the other is an execution
file that injects shell code for the next stage.



Figure 1: Telemetry




Figure 7: Decoy PDF files


SHELL CODE INJECTOR

In this attack chain, we identified two types of injectors. The first leverages
an image file to obtain a shell code. As of mid-July, it had low detection rates
on VirusTotal.



Figure 8: Shell code injector on VirusTotal

After anti-debugging checking, it starts downloading a JPG file from the
Imghippo website, “hxxps://i.imghippo[.]com/files/0hVAM1719847927[.]png.” It
then uses the Windows API “GdipBitmapGetPixel” to access the pixels and decode
the bytes to get the shell code.


Figure 9: Getting the PNG file

It then calls “dword ptr ss:[ebp-F4]” to the entry point of the shell code. The
shell code first obtains all the APIs from a CRC32 hash, creates a folder, and
drops files in “%TEMP%.” We can tell that these dropped files are HijackLoader
based on the typical bytes “\x49\x44\x 41\x54\xC6\xA5\x79\xEA” found in the
encrypted data.


Figure 10: Call shell code's entry point




Figure 11: CRC32 hashes for Windows APIs




Figure 12: Dropping files in the temp folder




Figure 13: Dropped HijackLoader files

The other injector is more straightforward. It decrypts its code from the data
section and uses a series of Windows API functions—NtCreateSection,
NtMapViewOfSection, NtUnmapViewOfSection, NtMapViewOfSection again, and
NtProtectVirtualMemory—to perform shell code injection.


Figure 14: Assembly code for calling shell code


FINAL STEALERS

This attack uses Meduza Stealer version 2.9 and the panel found at
hxxp://5[.]42[.]107[.]78/auth/login.


Figure 15: Meduza Stealer's panel

We also identified an ACR stealer loaded from HijackLoader. This ACR stealer
hides its C2 with a dead drop resolver (DDR) technique on the Steam community
website, hxxps://steamcommunity[.]com/profiles/76561199679420718. 


Figure 16: Base64 encoded C2 on Steam

We also found the C2 for other ACR Stealers on Steam by searching for the
specific string, “t6t”. 


Figure 17: Other ACR Stealer’s C2 server information on Steam

After retrieving the C2 hostname, the ACR stealer appends specific strings to
construct a complete URL,
“hxxps://pcvcf[.]xyz/ujs/a4347708-adfb-411c-8f57-c2c166fcbe1d”. This URL then
fetches the encoded configuration from the remote server. The configuration data
typically contains crucial information, such as target specifics and operational
parameters for the stealer. By decoding the C2 from Steam, the stealer can adapt
legitimate web services to maintain communications with its C2 server.


Figure 18: Decoded ACR Stealer's configuration

Except for local text files in paths “Documents” and “Recent, “ ACR Stealer has
the following target applications:

 * Browser: Google Chrome, Google Chrome SxS, Google Chrome Beta, Google Chrome
   Dev, Google Chrome Unstable, Google Chrome Canary, Epic Privacy Browser,
   Vivaldi, 360Browser Browser, CocCoc Browser, K-Melon, Orbitum, Torch,
   CentBrowser, Chromium, Chedot, Kometa, Uran, liebao, QIP Surf, Nichrome,
   Chromodo, Coowon, CatalinaGroup Citrio, uCozMedia Uran, Elements Browser,
   MapleStudio ChromePlus, Maxthon3, Amigo, Brave-Browser, Microsoft Edge, Opera
   Stable, Opera GX Stable, Opera Neon, Mozilla Firefox, BlackHawk, and TorBro.
 * CryptoWallet: Bitcoin, Binance, Electrum, Electrum-LTC, Ethereum, Exodus,
   Anoncoin, BBQCoin, devcoin, digitalcoin, Florincoin, Franko, Freicoin,
   GoldCoin (GLD), GInfinitecoin, IOCoin, Ixcoin, Litecoin, Megacoin, Mincoin,
   Namecoin, Primecoin, Terracoin, YACoin, Dogecoin, ElectronCash, MultiDoge,
   com.liberty.jaxx, atomic, Daedalus Mainnet, Coinomi, Ledger Live, Authy
   Desktop, Armory, DashCore, Zcash, Guarda, WalletWasabi, and Monero.
 * Messenger: Telegram, Pidgin, Signal, Tox, Psi, Psi+, and WhatsApp.
 * FTP Client: FileZilla, GoFTP, UltraFXP, NetDrive, FTP Now, DeluxeFTP,
   FTPGetter, Steed, Estsoft ALFTP, BitKinex, Notepad++ plugins NppFTP, FTPBox,
   INSoftware NovaFTP, and BlazeFtp.
 * Email Clients: Mailbird, eM Client, The Bat!, PMAIL, Opera Mail, yMail2,
   TrulyMail, Pocomail, and Thunderbird.
 * VPN Service: NordVPN and AzireVPN.
 * Password Manager: Bitwarden, NordPass, 1Password, and RoboForm.
 * Other: AnyDesk, MySQL Workbench, GHISLER, Sticky Notes, Notezilla , To-Do
   DeskList, snowflake-ssh, and GmailNotifierPro.
 * The following Chrome Extensions:

nphplpgoakhhjchkkhmiggakijnkhfnd

apbldaphppcdfbdnnogdikheafliigcf

fldfpgipfncgndfolcbkdeeknbbbnhcc

ckdjpkejmlgmanmmdfeimelghmdfeobe

omaabbefbmiijedngplfjmnooppbclkk

iodngkohgeogpicpibpnaofoeifknfdo

afbcbjpbpfadlkmhmclhkeeodmamcflc

hnefghmjgbmpkjjfhefnenfnejdjneog

lodccjjbdhfakaekdiahmedfbieldgik

fpcamiejgfmmhnhbcafmnefbijblinff

hcflpincpppdclinealmandijcmnkbgn

egdddjbjlcjckiejbbaneobkpgnmpknp

bcopgchhojmggmffilplmbdicgaihlkp

nihlebdlccjjdejgocpogfpheakkpodb

fhmfendgdocmcbmfikdcogofphimnkno

ilbibkgkmlkhgnpgflcjdfefbkpehoom

kpfopkelmapcoipemfendmdcghnegimn

oiaanamcepbccmdfckijjolhlkfocbgj

fhbohimaelbohpjbbldcngcnapndodjp

ldpmmllpgnfdjkmhcficcifgoeopnodc

cnmamaachppnkjgnildpdmkaakejnhae

mbcafoimmibpjgdjboacfhkijdkmjocd

nlbmnnijcnlegkjjpcfjclmcfggfefdm

jbdpelninpfbopdfbppfopcmoepikkgk

amkmjjmmflddogmhpjloimipbofnfjih

onapnnfmpjmbmdcipllnjmjdjfonfjdm

cphhlgmgameodnhkjdmkpanlelnlohao

cfdldlejlcgbgollnbonjgladpgeogab

kncchdigobghenbbaddojjnnaogfppfj

ablbagjepecncofimgjmdpnhnfjiecfm

jojhfeoedkpkglbfimdfabpdfjaoolaf

fdfigkbdjmhpdgffnbdbicdmimfikfig

ffnbelfdoeiohenkjibnmadjiehjhajb

njojblnpemjkgkchnpbfllpofaphbokk

pdgbckgdncnhihllonhnjbdoighgpimk

hjagdglgahihloifacmhaigjnkobnnih

ookjlbkiijinhpmnjffcofjonbfbgaoc

pnlccmojcmeohlpggmfnbbiapkmbliob

mnfifefkajgofkcjkemidiaecocnkjeh

ljfpcifpgbbchoddpjefaipoiigpdmag

flpiciilemghbmfalicajoolhkkenfel

bhghoamapcdpbohphigoooaddinpkbai

jfdlamikmbghhapbgfoogdffldioobgl

gaedmjdfmmahhbjefcbgaolhhanlaolb

nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn

imloifkgjagghnncjkhggdhalmcnfklk

aiifbnbfobpmeekipheeijimdpnlpgpp

oeljdldpnmdbchonielidgobddffflal

aeachknmefphepccionboohckonoeemg

ilgcnhelpchnceeipipijaljkblbcobl

hpglfhgfnhbgpjdenjgmdgoeiappafln

nngceckbapebfimnlniiiahkandclblb

nknhiehlklippafakaeklbeglecifhad

oboonakemofpalcgghocfoadofidjkkk

dmkamcknogkgcdfhhbddcghachkejeap

fdjamakpfbbddfjaooikfcpapjohcfmg

jnmbobjmhlngoefaiojfljckilhhlhcj

fooolghllnmhmmndgjiamiiodkpenpbb

klnaejjgbibmhlephnhpmaofohgkpgkd

bfogiafebfohielmmehodmfbbebbbpei

ibnejdfjmmkpcnlpebklmnkoeoihofec

lfochlioelphaglamdcakfjemolpichk

ejbalbakoplchlghecdalmeeeajnimhm

hdokiejnpimakedhajhdlcegeplioahd

kjmoohlgokccodicjjfebfomlbljgfhk

naepdomgkenhinolocfifgehidddafch

fnjhmkhhmkbjkkabndcnnogagogbneec

bmikpgodpkclnkgmnpphehdgcimmided

nhnkbkgjikgcigadomkphalanndcapjk

nofkfblpeailgignhkbnapbephdnmbmn

hnfanknocfeofbddgcijnmhnfnkdnaad

jhfjfclepacoldmjmkmdlmganfaalklb

cihmoadaighcejopammfbmddcmdekcje

chgfefjpcobfbnpmiokfjjaglahmnded

bfnaelmomeimhlpmgjnjophhpkkoljpa

igkpcodhieompeloncfnbekccinhapdb

djclckkglechooblngghdinmeemkbgci

cfhdojbkjhnklbpkdaibdccddilifddb

jiidiaalihmmhddjgbnbgdfflelocpak

kmmkllgcgpldbblpnhghdojehhfafhro

lgmpcpglpngdoalbgeoldeajfclnhafa

ibegklajigjlbljkhfpenpfoadebkokl

egjidjbpglichdcondbcbdnbeeppgdph

ijpdbdidkomoophdnnnfoancpbbmpfcn

flhbololhdbnkpnnocoifnopcapiekdi

llalnijpibhkmpdamakhgmcagghgmjab

kkhmbjifakpikpapdiaepgkdephjgnma

mjdmgoiobnbombmnbbdllfncjcmopfnc

ekkhlihjnlmjenikbgmhgjkknoelfped

dlcobpjiigpikoobohmabehhmhfoodbb

jngbikilcgcnfdbmnmnmnleeomffciml

jnlgamecbpmbajjfhmmmlhejkemejdma

hcjginnbdlkdnnahogchmeidnmfckjom

kbdcddcmgoplfockflacnnefaehaiocb

ogphgbfmhodmnmpnaadpbdadldbnmjji

kgdijkcfiglijhaglibaidbipiejjfdp

hhmkpbimapjpajpicehcnmhdgagpfmjc

epapihdplajcdnnkdeiahlgigofloibg

ojhpaddibjnpiefjkbhkfiaedepjheca

mgffkfbidihjpoaomajlbgchddlicgpn

fmhjnpmdlhokfidldlglfhkkfhjdmhgl

ebfidpplhabeedpnhjnobghokpiioolj

gjhohodkpobnogbepojmopnaninookhj

dngmlblcodfobpdpecaadgfbcggfjfnm

hmglflngjlhgibbmcedpdabjmcmboamo

ldinpeekobnhjjdofggfgjlcehhmanlj

eklfjjkfpbnioclagjlmklgkcfmgmbpg

mdjmfdffdcmnoblignmgpommbefadffd

jbkfoedolllekgbhcbcoahefnbanhhlh

aflkmfhebedbjioipglgcbcmnbpgliof

mcohilncbfahbmgdjkbpemcciiolgcge

dmjmllblpcbmniokccdoaiahcdajdjof

jbdaocneiiinmjbjlgalhcelgbejmnid

lnnnmfcpbkafcpgdilckhmhbkkbpkmid

blnieiiffboillknjnepogjhkgnoapac

odpnjmimokcmjgojhnhfcnalnegdjmdn

cjelfplplebdjjenllpjcblmjkfcffne

bopcbmipnjdcdfflfgjdgdjejmgpoaab

fihkakfobkmkjojpchpfgcmhfjnmnfpi

cpmkedoipcpimgecpmgpldfpohjplkpp

kkpllkodjeloidieedojogacfhpaihoh

khpkpbbcccdmmclmpigdgddabeilkdpd

nanjmdknhkinifnkgdcggcfnhdaammmj

mcbigmjiafegjnnogedioegffbooigli

nkddgncdjgjfcddamfgcmfnlhccnimig

fiikommddbeccaoicoejoniammnalkfa

acmacodkjbdgmoleebolmdjonilkdbch

heefohaffomkkkphnlpohglngmbcclhi

phkbamefinggmakgklpkljjmgibohnba

ocjdpmoallmgmjbbogfiiaofphbjgchh

efbglgofoippbgcjepnhiblaibcnclgk

hmeobnfnfcmdkdcmlblgagmfpfboieaf

lpfcbjknijpeeillifnkikgncikgfhdo

kfdniefadaanbjodldohaedphafoffoh

ejjladinnckdgjemekebdpeokbikhfci

kmhcihpebfmpgmihbkipmjlmmioameka

opcgpfmipidbgpenhmajoajpbobppdil

gafhhkghbfjjkeiendhlofajokpaflmk

aholpfdialjgjfhomihkjbmgjidlcdno

kglcipoddmbniebnibibkghfijekllbl

onhogfjeacnfoofkfgppdlbmlmnplgbn

iokeahhehimjnekafflcihljlcjccdbe

mopnmbcafieddcagagdcbnhejhlodfdd

idnnbdplmphpflfnlkomgpfbpcgelopg

fijngjgcjhjmmpcmkeiomlglpeiijkld

kmphdnilpmdejikjdnlbcnmnabepfgkh

hifafgmccdpekplomjjkcfgodnhcellj

cgeeodpfagjceefieflmdfphplkenlfk

ijmpgkjfkbfhoebgogflfebnmejmfbm

pdadjkfkgcafgbceimcpbkalnfnepbnk

lkcjlnjfpbikmcmbachjpdbijejflpcm

odbfpeeihdkbihmopkbjmoonfanlbfcl

onofpnbbkehpmmoabgpcpmigafmmnjh

fhilaheimglignddkjgofkcbgekhenbh

dkdedlpgdmmkkfjabffeganieamfklkm

aodkkagnadcbobfpggfnjeongemjbjca

nlgbhdfgdhgbiamfdfmbikcdghidoadd

dngmlblcodfobpdpecaadgfbcggfjfnm

infeboajgfhgbjpjbeppbkgnabfdkdaf

lpilbniiabackdjcionkobglmddfbcjo

ppbibelpcjmhbdihakflkdcoccbgbkpo

bhhhlbepdkbapadjdnnojkbgioiodbic

klghhnkeealcohjjanjjdaeeggmfmlpl

jnkelfanjkeadonecabehalmbgpfodjm

enabgbdfcbaehmbigakijjabdpdnimlg

jgaaimajipbpdogpdglhaphldakikgef

mmmjbcfofconkannjonfmjjajpllddbg

kppfdiipphfccemcignhifpjkapfbihd

bifidjkcdpgfnlbcjpdkdcnbiooooblg

loinekcabhlmhjjbocijdoimmejangoa

nebnhfamliijlghikdgcigoebonmoibm

anokgmphncpekkhclmingpimjmcooifb

fcfcfllfndlomdhbehjjcoimbgofdncg

cnncmdhjacpkmjmkcafchppbnpnhdmon

ojggmchlghnjlapmfbnjholfjkiidbch

mkpegjkblkkefacfnmkajcjmabijhclg


CONCLUSION

This campaign primarily targets CVE-2024-21412 to spread LNK files for
downloading execution files that embed HTA script code within their overlays.
The HTA script runs silently, avoiding any pop-up windows, and clandestinely
downloads two files: a decoy PDF and an execution file designed to inject shell
code, setting the stage for the final stealers.

To mitigate such threats, organizations must educate their users about the
dangers of downloading and running files from unverified sources. Continuous
innovation by threat actors necessitates a robust and proactive cybersecurity
strategy to protect against sophisticated attack vectors. Proactive measures,
user awareness, and stringent security protocols are vital components in
safeguarding an organization's digital assets.


FORTINET PROTECTIONS

The malware described in this report is detected and blocked by FortiGuard
Antivirus:

LNK/Agent.OQ!tr
LNK/Agent.BNE!tr
LNK/Agent.ACX!tr
W32/Agent.DAT!tr
W64/Agent.EDE6!tr
W32/Agent.AAN!tr
W64/Agent.A8D2!tr

FortiGate, FortiMail, FortiClient, and FortiEDR support the FortiGuard AntiVirus
service. The FortiGuard AntiVirus engine is part of each of these solutions. As
a result, customers who have these products with up-to-date protections are
protected.

The FortiGuard Web Filtering Service blocks the C2 servers and downloads URLs.

FortiGuard Labs provides IPS signature against attacks exploiting
CVE-2024-21412:

MS.Windows.SmartScreen.CVE-2024-21412.Security.Feature.Bypass

We also suggest that organizations go through Fortinet’s free NSE training
module: NSE 1 – Information Security Awareness. This module is designed to help
end users learn how to identify and protect themselves from phishing attacks.

FortiGuard IP Reputation and Anti-Botnet Security Service proactively block
these attacks by aggregating malicious source IP data from the Fortinet
distributed network of threat sensors, CERTs, MITRE, cooperative competitors,
and other global sources that collaborate to provide up-to-date threat
intelligence about hostile sources.

If you believe this or any other cybersecurity threat has impacted your
organization, please contact our Global FortiGuard Incident Response Team.


IOCS


IP ADDRESSES

62[.]133[.]61[.]26

62[.]133[.]61[.]43

5[.]42[.]107[.]78


HOSTNAMES

21centuryart[.]com

scratchedcards[.]com

proffyrobharborye[.]xyz

answerrsdo[.]shop

pcvcf[.]xyz

pcvvf[.]xyz

pdddk[.]xyz

pdddj[.]xyz

pddbj[.]xyz

pbpbj[.]xyz

pbdbj[.]xyz

ptdrf[.]xyz

pqdrf[.]xyz


FILES

e15b200048fdddaedb24a84e99d6d7b950be020692c02b46902bf5af8fb50949

547b6e08b0142b4f8d024bac78eb1ff399198a8d8505ce365b352e181fc4a544

bd823f525c128149d70f633e524a06a0c5dc1ca14dd56ca7d2a8404e5a573078

982338768465b79cc8acd873a1be2793fccbaa4f28933bcdf56b1d8aa6919b47

bc6933a8fc324b907e6cf3ded3f76adc27a6ad2445b4f5db1723ac3ec86ed10d

59d2c2ca389ab1ba1fefa4a06b14ae18a8f5b70644158d5ec4fb7a7eac4c0a08

8568226767ac2748eccc7b9832fac33e8aa6bfdc03eafa6a34fb5d81e5992497

4043aa37b5ba577dd99f6ca35c644246094f4f579415652895e6750fb9823bd9

0604e7f0b4f7790053991c33359ad427c9bf74c62bec3e2d16984956d0fb9c19

8c6d355a987bb09307e0af6ac8c3373c1c4cbfbceeeb1159a96a75f19230ede6

de6960d51247844587a21cc0685276f966747e324eb444e6e975b0791556f34f

6c779e427b8d861896eacdeb812f9f388ebd43f587c84a243c7dab9ef65d151c

08c75c6a9582d49ea3fe780509b6f0c9371cfcd0be130bc561fae658b055a671

abc54ff9f6823359071d755b151233c08bc2ed1996148ac61cfb99c7e8392bfe

643dde3f461907a94f145b3cd8fe37dbad63aec85a4e5ed759fe843b9214a8d2





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