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RADAR WARNING RECEIVERS
AND
DEFENSIVE ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES


Australian Aviation, September, 1988 by Carlo Kopp
© 1988,  2005 Carlo Kopp



Born in the darkest hours of the Blitz, weaned during the night bombing
offensive and matured in the skies above Hanoi. Electronic Warfare has become a
military discipline within itself with a pervasive influence upon the strategy,
tactics and technology of modern warfare. No more is this evident than in the
modern air battle where Electronic Warfare (EW) drives penetration strategy and
tactics, while fundamentally influencing airframe and weapon system design.

The outcomes of the last three major air battles, the Falklands, the Bekaa
Valley and the Tripoli Raid were largely determined by the application of EW
techniques with the losers suffering in every instance overwhelming defeat.

Not surprisingly EW has acquired an image of being black box magic which is in
reality hardly deserved as the vast majority of EW techniques involve no more
than clever application of established electrical engineering principles to the
problem of defeating the opponent's electronic equipment. This aspect of the
electronic battle is often underplayed but imposes an implicit need for
restricting access to weapon system design parameters and constraints.
Understanding the inner workings of an opponent's design allows you to defeat it
regardless of its initial development cost. There is no such thing as a weapon
system without a vulnerability; ample illustration to this point is given by the
USAF meticulously digging pieces of a Stealth fighter out of a Californian
hillside.

By definition EW is military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy
to determine, exploit, reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic
spectrum and action which retains friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
More specifically it is the application of technology, strategy and tactics to
deny the opponent the partial or full use of those electronic systems which rely
upon the transmission of electromagnetic energy, primarily radar and
communications.

Needless to say radar and communications are pivotal components in any modern
air defence system and it is in this area that EW has found its most dramatic
application. Historically EW emerged as a discipline during the Luftwaffe night
blitz and credit for its development as a discipline goes without any doubt to
the British. The British successfully degraded the performance of the
Luftwaffe's Knickebein and Wotan radio navigation systems by jamming and
followed this with the successful application of communications jamming, radar
deception jamming and chaff (window) during the night bombing offensive. Sadly
Bomber Command was unable to match its success in the application of offensive
EW with effective defensive countermeasures which resulted in a horrendous
sustained loss rate (refer p122 Mar 88 AA). Ignorance of EW kills which history
proves repeatedly, yet decision makers blindly persist in their rejection of the
discipline, remaining oblivious to the vital issues.

The significant aspect of the early British EW effort was the emphasis on
offensive techniques rather than defensive systems, this past and current trend
seems to stem from the greater publicity associated with major offensives rather
than an appreciation of sustained loss rates.

The next major phase in EW development took place during the early sixties when
the USAF and USN equipped their fleet of tactical aircraft with the first
generation of defensive systems; radar warning receivers and defensive jammers.
While such equipment was carried by RAF and SAC bombers, it rapidly became a
necessity for tactical aircraft operating over the increasingly hostile North
Vietnamese air defence system. Massed deployment of Russian radar guided SAMs
led to the most protracted electronic battle in history. Understandably, most
attention was attracted by the USAF's specialised EB-66 jammers, F-100F and
F-105G Wild Weasels and the Navy's EA-6A, EA-6B tacjammers and A-6B intruder,
F-4F Iron Hand aircraft. Less apparent but no less important was the
proliferation of various defensive systems such as the podded USAF ALQ-75, 77
and 87 jammers, the podded USN ALQ-76 and 81 jammers, the APR-25 series warning
receivers and later digital ALR-46 radar homing and warning equipment. EW had
come of age and EW equipment had become an integral part of new tactical
aircraft system design. The Americans left Vietnam with valuable experience and
promptly initiated the development of a new generation of defensive systems and
the EF-111A, F-4G Wild Weasel and HARM anti-radiation missile. The Russians left
Vietnam with valuable booty in the form of stockpiles of US EW equipment and
spares held in South Vietnam, this led to a major qualitative leap in Russian
equipment by the late seventies.

The Middle East had meanwhile become the arena for electronic warfare and the
Yom Kippur war of 1973 saw the Israelis lose over a hundred aircraft to radar
directed AAA and SAMs - failing to heed the US they fitted their aircraft with
very limited EW equipment. Nine years down the track it was clear that the
Israelis had typically learned well, the Bekaa Valley air battle saw the
Israelis destroy 19 SAM batteries and down over eighty aircraft all within a few
days, for the loss of two aircraft. The Israelis had integrated EW techniques
into their operational doctrine and applied it to every facet of the air/land
battle with stunning results.

The short but sharp TAC F-111 raid on Tripoli in 1986 also reiterated the point
beyond any doubt, the only casualty an F-111 lost in an accident.

At this instant it appears that NATO has finally taken notice with Germany and
Italy seeking dedicated Tornado Electronic Combat/Recce aircraft and the UK
progressing with its sophisticated Alarm ARM, these systems complementing the
USAF's EF-111 A/F-4G/HARM force and the USN's EA-6B/ HARM force.




F-111 aircraft carry the most extensive electronic warfare suite fitted to a
tactical aircraft. The large ALR-62 RHAW is complemented by a range of
homing/warning receivers such as the ALR-31/39/41 and an infra-red tail warning
system. Defensive jamming is provided by the ALQ-94/137 jammer which is
effective against pulse mode and continuous wave threats and additional ALQ-119
or ALQ-131 jamming pods can be carried on an aft ventral centreline attachment.
Newer pods such as the ALQ-131 are modular which allows a pod to be tailored to
a particular threat environment which threat specific hardware modules and
software. Below Westinghouse ALQ-131 jamming pod fit check on F-111C
(Westinghouse).








The electronic battle is however very fluid and every measure has a
countermeasure and every countermeasure a counter-countermeasure and so on ...
it will be interesting to see whether the commitment exists to sustain this long
overdue growth in capability.

Radar Warning Receivers

EW systems can be broadly divided into self protection systems and support
jamming systems. The former are those pieces of equipment which are carried by
an aircraft to protect itself from hostile electronic systems, the latter are
those systems carried by dedicated jamming platforms. Self protection systems in
turn fall into two categories, passive Radar Warning Receivers (RWR) which alert
the pilot to illumination by hostile radar and defensive Electronic Counter
Measures (ECM) which jam specific hostile weapon systems.

The sophistication and degree of integration of RWRs and ECM are role dependent
and the systems carried by light tactical aircraft such as the F-16 and F-18
cannot compare with those carried by heavyweights dedicated to deep penetration
such as the F-15 or F-111.

The RWR is the simplest and most essential component of any EW suite. The
simplest and most commonly used RWR is the crystal video receiver which offers
respectable performance in spite of its basic conceptual simplicity. In a
crystal video receiver, the impinging microwave transmission from a hostile
radar falls upon a wide band receiving antenna from which it is fed into a bank
of simple filter/detector/amplifier receivers each of which is much like the
receivers used by motorists to detect police radars. The receivers are each
tuned to consecutive slices of the covered band which allows simultaneous
reception and discrimination of radars operating in various parts of the band.

The output signal from each of the constituent receivers is an electrical signal
which represents the envelope of the detected microwave signal - if the
microwave signal was a train of pulses (typical in radar) the output is like
pulses. Such an RWR can indicate, with high probability of intercept, the
presence of a radar signal impinging upon its antenna.

This alone is of limited use as in practice it is desirable to know in which
direction the radar is. This is accomplished by using a set of four identical
matched crystal video receivers each fed by an antenna which covers a quadrant
of space about the carrying aircraft. By comparing the strength of the output
signals from the receivers, the direction of the radar can be estimated with
reasonable accuracy.

The raw output from such a RWR must be interpreted. The simplest technique is to
feed it into a headset and listen for the characteristic buzz, chirp or whistle
of the sought radar type. In practice interpretation is the task of an analogue
or digital signal processor which identifies the pulse trains associated with
particular radars in specific modes of operation. Understandably this is a task
demanding considerable computing power in a high density signal environment and
this accounts for much of the cost in a RWR. Once the signals have been
identified they must be prioritised as threats and sorted.

For instance a SAM fire control illuminator locked on to the aircraft is a far
greater threat than a surveillance radar. Modern RWRs employ microprocessors to
perform this task often in conjunction with the signal processing function. The
prioritised threat data is then fed to a cockpit display usually as synthetic
symbols. This provides the pilot or weapon system operator with plan position
indication of threats to facilitate defensive manoeuvring.

The threat data can also be fed to onboard jammers which can improve the potency
of the jamming system. A well established RWR type is exampled by the Litton
ALR-45 family, developed from the Vietnam era APR-25 RWR and much the standard
USN RWR carried by the A-6, EA-6B A-7, F-14A and F-18. The ALR-45 comprises four
cavity backed spiral antennas feeding four crystal video receiver
(detector/video amplifier) assemblies which are in turn tied to a hard wired
threat processor. The threat processor is interfaced to a cockpit display and
control panel.

The late model ALR-45F employs a computer based threat processor and a
MIL-STD-1553B bus compatible display terminal, both of which are interchangeable
with the successor to the ALR-45, the newer ALR-67.

While the crystal video receiver coupled to a capable threat processor is a very
effective defensive tool, its low sensitivity limits its application to
detecting close and therefore immediate threats to the aircraft. More
sensitivity can be gained by the use of superheterodyne receivers. This will
however impose the need for a far more capable threat processor as the area
covered about the aircraft increases with the square of detection range.

This vastly increases the number of threats to be identified and sorted. The
additional capability is often well worth while and can be exploited to give a
threat a wide berth or to track it and attack it. Systems in this class are
understandably more complex and expensive and are usually carried by deep
penetration aircraft: the F-15's Loral ALR-56 falls into this category.





Amongst the most extensively equipped F-18A aircraft in service, Canadian/NATO
CF-18s carry the ALQ-162 continuous wave jammer in addition to the aircraft's
basic EW suite. Standard F-18A aircraft carry the ALR-45D/F warning receiver and
the ALQ-126A/B trackbreaker defensive jammer effective against pulse mode
threats. Exposure to PVO SA-6B SAMs and other continuous wave threats
necessitates the fitting of additional defensive jammers such as the pylon
mounted ALQ-162 (see inset).

While the primary function of the RWR is detection of threats to facilitate
evasion, the RWR can also be used to support ECM (jammers) which are another key
part of an electronic armoury.

Defensive Electronic CounterMeasures

Jammers can be broadly divided into two categories, noise jammers and deception
jammers. In either instance the jammer comprises a receiver which listens for
threat radars, a processor to make decisions and a tunable transmitter. The
transmitter is automatically tuned to the frequency of the hostile transmission
and jams it by transmitting a commanded signal.

A noise jammer will transmit a signal much like electrical noise which results
in the radar return (echo) from the aircraft being obscured and at range may
cause the aircraft to disappear from the threat operator's scope. At closer
range however considerable power is required to outshout the return from the
jamming aircraft and distinct radial lines termed strobes will appear on the
victim's scope. The operator will know he is being jammed and may attempt to
tune the radar to a slightly different frequency which may or may not defeat the
jammer (a technique used to defeat an ECM system is termed an Electronic Counter
CounterMeasure or ECCM).

At some even closer range the victim radar will 'burn through' the jamming as
the return becomes more powerful than the jamming transmission, the aircraft
will then become distinguishable from the jamming.

A deception jammer doesn't attempt to conceal the presence of the aircraft but
rather transmits signals very much like the real return to deceive the radar or
its operator.

The number of deception jamming techniques is immense and every type of radar
and specific design of a radar has some exploitable vulnerability.

Broadly, deception jammers can be divided into false target generators and track
breakers.

A false target generator is usually employed against a track-while-scan
surveillance radar with the objective of confusing the operator or saturating
the tracking computer. It achieves this by transmitting false radar returns,
usually delayed retransmitted versions of the radar's actual pulses. This
creates the illusion of a whole formation of aircraft rather than the single
real target which vastly complicates interpretation of the tactical situation.
Because of the difficulty involved in generating credible false target signals
this technique is often combined with noise jamming which degrades the
performance of the victim radar so that the false targets are impossible to
distinguish from the real target, if not concealing the real target completely.

Track breakers are usually employed against tracking radars in single target
track mode, these are typically fire control radars associated with SAMs, AAMs
and AAA. Track breaking techniques are therefore of major importance in tactical
and strategic aircraft.

Track breakers attack the automatic tracking mechanism of the victim radar. If
the threat is a pulsed radar a track breaker will usually transmit a 'cover
pulse' at the same time as the return pulse. This masks the return and the
victim tracking mechanism is then allowed to lock on to the cover pulse rather
than the weaker real return. The jammer has then seduced the tracking mechanism
and can, within limits, move the target about its real position and typically
turn it off to break lock.

The target will often be made to erratically jitter which makes it impossible to
accurately guide a missile or fire a gun at the target.

This is termed gate stealing and can be applied in various ways to many diverse
radar types (angle/range/velocity gate walk-off/pull-off/stealing) including
Continuous Wave (CW, ie non-pulsed radar, often used in fire control
illuminators for SAMs) radars (FM-CW ranging).

Other track breaking techniques disrupt the angular tracking of the target by
attacking the antenna scan mechanism. Conical scan radars (common in missile
seekers and AAA) can be jammed by rapidly varying the amplitude of the jamming
signal at a rate close to the rotation rate of the antenna, this will drive the
antenna wildly off target and is termed Amplitude Modulation or AM ECM.

Monopulse radars are notoriously difficult to jam and require more cunning
techniques such as cross eye jamming. A cross eye jammer employs two deception
repeaters which retransmit the impinging radar signal with set time delays. By
situating the transmitting antennas at the extremities of the aircraft (eg out
on the wings) and manipulating the time delays, the cross-eye jammer distorts
the shape (and hence perceived direction) of the returned echo (wavefront). A
monopulse track ing system aligns itself with the direction of the incoming
return from the target and is thus driven off the target.

ECM equipment is usually carried internally although podded jammers are
available for older aircraft or as a supplement to an internal system where
required by a specific threat. Tactical aircraft which must grapple with threats
at close quarters rely primarily on track breaking ECM to penetrate terminal
defences and equipment such as the Sanders ALQ-126B carried by the F-18A is
typical of this class. The ALQ-126 family of jammers succeeded the earlier USN
standard ALQ-100 jammers and is carried by the A-6, EA-6, A-7, F-14 and F-18.
The B model provides E, F, G, H, I/J band coverage and implements several
techniques effective against pulse mode and conical scanning radars. Delivering
over 1 kw of jam power per band in pulse mode the 126B can be operated
autonomously or tied in with an ALR-45F/67 RWR. In a high threat environment the
ALQ-126 would be supplemented with a Northrop ALQ-162 Compass Sail/Clockwise
continuous wave jammer which is effective against CW threats such as the SA-6
Gainful family of semi-active radar guided SAMs.

Deep penetration aircraft carry more extensive systems with noise jamming
capability against radar (ALQ-94/F-111, ALQ-155/ALT-2B/B-52, ALQ-161, B-1B),
missile tracking downlinks (B-52) and false target generating capability
(ALQ-122/B-52).

Expendables

While RWRs and ECM represent the sophisticated side of EW, expendables must not
be overlooked. The most commonly used expendable is chaff (window) which is
finely chopped metal foil or metal coated plastic strands. Dumping chaff from an
aircraft creates a radar reflective cloud which can be of at least nuisance
value although it is often most effective against simpler radar guided missile
seekers. Chaff is often supplemented by expendable jammers. These are usually
small battery powered noise jammers or deception repeaters built into a small
capsule which is suspended on a parachute. Expendable jammers are dispensed by
an aircraft to degrade threat radar performance or seduce radar guided weapons.

A further class of expendables are flares which are dropped to seduce or confuse
heat seeking missiles. Often all expendables are dispensed by a single
countermeasures dispenser, controlled by the RWR. A typical device is the USN
standard AEL ALE-39 carried by the A-4, A-6, A-7, F-14 and F-18 aircraft. The
ALE-39 can be configured with a mixed load of up to 60 expendables, chaff,
jammers and flares, dispensed selectively or mixed and under RWR control if
necessary.

The F-111 Electronic Warfare Systems

The demanding role of unescorted deep strike performed by the F-111 family
requires an extensive EW system with greater capability than that of smaller
tactical fighters such as the F-16 or F-18. This reflects in complexity,
maintainability and hence cost, the F-111 carries the most elaborate EW system
in any tactical aircraft today.

The core of the system is the Dalmo Victor ALR-62 Radar Homing And Warning
(RHAW) system which superceded the earlier APS-109A/C RHAW. The ALR-62 has
forward and aft antenna sets, the forward pair are flush inset in the skin of
the forward avionics (radar) bay and provide high and mid band coverage. Antenna
outputs feed forward and aft receiver sets which in turn feed a digital signal
processor.





Threats are displayed on a circular cockpit CRT display next to the TFR E-scope
and on a combined indicator/countermeasures control panel above the radar/Pave
Tack display.

The ALR-62 is complemented by a Cincinnati Electronics AAR-34 Infra-Red
Receiving Set unique in a tactical aircraft as it tracks the infra-red emissions
of a pursuing missile's exhaust plume and provides an azimuth indication to the
pilot.

In USAF aircraft the ALR-62 is complemented by a Loral ALR-41 SAM warning
receiver and some aircraft also carried Loral ALR-31/39 homing receivers.

Expendables are dispensed via a Lundy ALE-28 unit controlled from the
navigator's starboard console.

The F-111 carries the Sanders/Varian ALQ-94 ECM and in some versions its
upgraded derivative the ALQ-137 which is one of the most sophisticated ECM
equipment suites carried on a tactical aircraft. The ALQ-94 was developed in the
late 1960s for TAC F-111 A/E/D and SAC FB-111 A aircraft, with SAC aircraft and
TAC EF-111As later receiving the 137 with improved rear coverage. The ALQ-94/137
is split into low (E/F), mid (G/H) and high (I/J) band subsystems with
independent control on a central panel.

Receiver and transmitter antennas for all three bands are mounted on the nose,
wing gloves and horizontal tail booms providing broad forward and aft coverage.

The ALQ-94/137 is effective against SAM and AAA fire control radars and airborne
intercept (AI) radars. It uses a crystal video receiver and signal processor to
provide prioritised power managed deception and noise jamming of multiple
threats in a dense signal environment, with pulse powers greater than 1 kW and
CW power of 100W. In a high threat environment the ALQ-94/137 may be
supplemented with external jammer pods, either the established Westinghouse
ALQ-119 or newer ALQ-131. The ALQ-131 is a self contained noise/deception jammer
with integral environmental control, a programmable central computer and a
modular jammer in 16 available configurations specific to threats.
Superheterodyne and crystal video receivers are used although the pod can be
slaved to the aircraft's RWR. The ALQ-119 and 131 are carried on a ventral
centreline attachment just aft of the main undercarriage well [Editor's Note: a
later modification adds a small pylon for the pod to the Pave Tack cradle
exterior or the weapon bay door].

The F-111's EW systems enabled the aircraft to penetrate deep into the North
Vietnamese air defence system without any escort jamming or defence suppression
aircraft, although more recently the aircraft is operated in conjunction with
dedicated escort jamming EF-111 A aircraft. This has become necessary in some
situations due to the high concentration of advanced SAM and AAA systems, eg the
Tripoli raid.

A planned upgrade to the internal ECM has however fallen victim to unusually
intense infighting between the USAF and the US Senate (how unusual for the F-111
...) with the proposed replacement ALQ-189 first cancelled in favour of the new
lightweight ALQ-165 Advanced Self Protection Jammer (ASPJ, itself planned for
use on most USAF and USN tactical aircraft) and then reinstated in a competition
with the ASPJ and a modified ALQ-161 (B-1) and at last count put on hold.

The RAAF have also sought an upgrade to the F-111A/C strike wing, however, given
the RAAF's unusually tight security on this subject it is not very clear where
the program is except that initial programme funding is expected before 1991.

In a tactical situation the RHAW and ECM are critical to the evasion of fighters
and SAMs. The ability of the RHAW to identify and classify threats and their
respective operating modes provides the navigator with a clear picture of the
tactical situation. On a typical strike mission the aircraft would encounter
both radar directed AAA and SAMs both covering the immediate target and in some
instances the most favourable approaches to the target as constrained by local
terrain. While low level penetration at 600kt itself can defeat many SAM
acquisition and tracking radars, newer versions of established SAMs are capable
of hitting targets down at 200ft, mainly by virtue of new solid state Doppler
look-down radar technology.

This raises the importance of ECM in defence penetration, the jammers may well
be all that is realistically standing between survival and destruction.

The penetrating F-111 would almost certainly evade the long range search radars
(eg: E/F band Bar Lock, E/F band AN/TPS-43 or AR-3D) but would be detected by
well placed SAM/AAA acquisition radar (eg: C band Flat Face) which would hand it
over to the area defence SAM system (typically an SA-6A/B supported by G/H band
Straight Flush and I-band CW illuminator, SA-11 Gadfly supported by I-band Flat
Lid or MIM-23 Hawk supported by an I-band CW illuminator).

The intruding aircraft could jam although it may choose not to at this stage to
avoid passive tracking of its transmissions. If jamming takes place it could
also serve to actually prevent a SAM launch. SAMs are often salvoed in twos,
threes or fours to complicate evasion and saturate the jammers and crew with
additional workload. Assuming that jamming and, if necessary, manoeuvring are
successful the SAMs would be defeated and the aircraft would run into the
terminal defences.




Black Box Magic - The ALR-66(VE) is typical of current Radar Warning Receiver
design practice. This RWR is a conventional crystal video receiver providing C
through J band coverage of pulse mode and continuous wave threats, with a
digital threat processor. The threat processor internal memory contains a
library of over 1,000 emitter signa tures, detected emitters are displayed with
synthetic symbology on a CRT display. In its ALR-66(V)2 version it is carried by
P-3B/C aircraft. The (VE) version is fitted to USN SH-2F ASW/Targeting
helicopters and is suitable for tactical aircraft (General Instrument Corp.)

These would be a mix of SAMs (eg mobile command link guided SA-8A/B Gecko
supported by G/H, I/J band Land Roll, mobile heat seeking SA-9 Gaskin supported
by J-band Gun Dish, heat seeking/anti radiation SA-13 Gopher, command guided
Rapier supported by I/J band Blindfire or command guided Crotale) and AAA (eg
ZSU-23-4P aimed by J-band Gun Dish).

We have included Western systems as unfortunately the modern adversary will not
always be restricted to Soviet supplied hardware.

Power managed jamming and chaff would be used against the radar guided weapons
while flares are employed against the heat seeking missiles, launch warning
provided if necessary by the aft mounted IR receiver. In this scenario command
guided SAMs are of concern as they usually carry backup optical tracking systems
to circumvent jamming of the fire control radar. The SA-8 was responsible for
one of the very few Israeli aircraft that were lost over the Bekaa Valley. Speed
and surprise are therefore of the essence and could make the big difference.

Assuming then that the crew pressed all the right buttons, all the black boxes
worked as advertised and all the right manoeuvres were flown the terminal
defences are penetrated and the F-111 drops its ordnance on top of the target.
Clean and 6,000 lb lighter it quickly accelerates to supersonic speed and heads
out of the target zone. Fighters would probably appear at this stage, vectored
by no doubt a very agitated ground control to pursue the penetrator.

Jamming of the fighter's AI radar at this stage can be most effective due to the
strong clutter return seen by the radar although recently deployed MiG-29
Fulcrum and Su-27 Flanker aircraft have reduced this advantage with their high
powered look-down shoot-down pulse Doppler radars.

Care must also be taken with the use of afterburner to avoid lock-on by
Infra-Red Search and Track (IRST) and heat seeking missiles. Heat seekers cued
by passive systems provide no warning other than an exhaust plume. Manoeuvring
and speed are therefore an essential part of evasion, coupled with clever use of
the RHAW to avoid detection if possible. At some point the fighter will break
off its attack having guzzled far too much fuel in afterburning intercept and
pursuit.

The complexity of the electronic battle even in conceptually simple single
aircraft unescorted strike missions illustrates the critical nature of EW in the
modern air battle. Those air forces which fail to keep their EW systems and
tactics up to date cannot expect to survive beyond a week of battle. As Israel's
painful experience in 1973 proves, even the best are not necessarily immune.

(The author will cover other Electronic Warfare topics in future issues .)

REFERENCES:

 1. Van Brunt L 8, 'Applied ECM', Vol 1, Vol 2, 1978, 1982, EW Engineering Inc
    
 2. Fitts R E, Lt Col, The Strategy of Electromagnetic Conflict, Peninsula
    Publishing, 1980.

























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