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TUNE IN: Taking Action on AI Today and in the Future
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Center for American Progress
HOW TURKEY CAN ENSURE A SUCCESSFUL ENERGY TRANSITION
* Sections
SECTIONS
* Introduction and summary
* The need for energy transition in Turkey
* The current standing and future opportunities of Turkey’s energy system
* Lessons from the United States and Germany
* Conclusion: Next steps in Turkey’s energy transition
* About the authors
* Acknowledgments
* Downloads
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* Report PDF (806 KB)
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ReportJul 10, 2018 Jul 10, 2018
HOW TURKEY CAN ENSURE A SUCCESSFUL ENERGY TRANSITION
Turkey should build upon recent progress investing in renewable energy to
transition its energy system and reduce its reliance on imported fossil fuels.
* Authors
AUTHORS
* Deger Saygin
* Max Hoffman
* Philipp Godron
Defense, Foreign Policy, International Issues, Middle East, National
Security+2 More
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SAM HANANEL
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GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
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* Report PDF (806 KB)
IN THIS ARTICLE
* Introduction and summary
* The need for energy transition in Turkey
* The current standing and future opportunities of Turkey’s energy system
* Lessons from the United States and Germany
* Conclusion: Next steps in Turkey’s energy transition
* About the authors
* Acknowledgments
A crucial stage of the electromechanical equipment installation of the
Hydroelectric Power Plant was accomplished in Batman, Turkey, May 2018.
(Getty/Selman Tur/Anadolu Agency)
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Turkey needs to transition its energy system rapidly in order to reduce its
reliance on imports, which account for 3 out of 4 units of Turkey’s total
primary energy supply. With a growing population and economy, the country’s
imported energy costs have reached alarming levels, driving a significant share
of Turkey’s current account deficit. Turkey’s population grew from 70 million
only a decade ago to 81 million people in 2017—the equivalent of adding a
metropolitan region the size of the Rhine-Ruhr in Germany or Chicago in the
United States.1 Alongside this population growth, the economy has seen gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita growth averaging 3 percent per year, with
growth exceeding 7 percent in 2010 and 2017 and 9 percent in 2011.2
This increasing demand has driven rapid growth of the country’s energy system,
including in conventional fossil fuels and renewable energy. Fortunately, Turkey
is endowed with significant renewable energy resources, a flexible financial
sector, an entrepreneurial business approach, and a large manufacturing and
engineering base. Turkey’s auction scheme for tenders—or awarding the rights to
undertake renewable energy projects—means that much of the installed renewable
energy equipment will also be locally produced, a product of government efforts
to position the country for the wider, global energy transition as part of its
ambitious plan for the 2023 centenary of the Republic.3
INPROGRESS
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Turkey’s energy transition is a largely positive story that has not received
enough attention by country analysts. By the end of 2017, renewable energy
accounted for nearly 30 percent of all Turkey’s electricity generation.4 Still,
the country needs to do more to transition its energy system to a more secure,
affordable, clean, and sustainable model, as well as attempt to meet its
ambitious energy and climate goals.
This report first explains the need for energy transition in Turkey, considering
the following three issue areas: energy security and the balance of trade; job
creation and economic activity; and environmental effects. The report then
explores the current standing and future opportunities of Turkey’s energy
system. After providing an overview of existing national energy and climate
strategy and policies, it discusses the crucial role of the electricity
generation sector and the need for adaptation in end-use sectors to improve
efficiency and incorporate variable renewable energy generation. The report also
highlights useful lessons that can be learned from the United States and
Germany. It concludes with recommendations for how Turkey can sustain its
progress and advance a smart energy transition.
THE NEED FOR ENERGY TRANSITION IN TURKEY
Unquestionably, Turkey’s top policy priority is to secure its energy supply and
keep up with the demand to sustain its economic growth as its population
increases. (see Figure 1) In addition to meeting growing demand, Turkey’s
specific economic priorities are shaping its energy transition. These priorities
include reducing the adverse environmental and economic impacts of increasing
fossil fuel use, making markets more competitive, giving consumers more energy
choices, and rapidly increasing renewable energy investments in both large and
distributed generation assets.5
Government incentives for and investments in renewable energy technology and
production stand to pay big dividends for Turkey. These efforts will help
strengthen energy security and the country’s bargaining position with suppliers;
reduce the current accounts deficit and ease inflationary pressures; grow the
high-technology industry; and create economic activity and jobs. They will also
reduce carbon emissions and improve the environment.
ENERGY SECURITY AND BALANCE OF TRADE
In 2016, Turkey’s total primary energy supply reached 135 million tons of oil
equivalent (Mtoe) per year—up from around 100 Mtoe in 2007. Although Turkey’s
total energy demand trails that of other countries in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Group of 20 (G-20), it is
the country with the fastest-growing market by demand.6 Electricity demand grew
by 7 percent per year in the 2000s and has continued to grow by 4–5 percent per
year.7 Total electricity demand is projected to reach between 440 terawatt hours
(TWh) and 550 TWh per year by 2030.8 The higher end of this range would be
equivalent to just less than double the current levels—295 TWh in 2017—over the
period. Around three-quarters of Turkey’s overall supply is imported, including
almost all gas and crude oil and two-thirds of coal.9
Demand for natural gas represents roughly 30 percent of the country’s total
primary energy supply. In 2015, Turkey used nearly 45 billion cubic meters (bcm)
of gas per year; this amount nearly doubled over the past decade.10 Russia
accounts for more than half of all supply of natural gas to Turkey, with Iran,
Azerbaijan, Algeria, and Nigeria making up the majority of the remainder.11
Likewise, oil accounts for more than 20 percent of Turkey’s total primary energy
supply,12 with 92 percent of crude oil imported largely from Iraq, Russia, and
Iran.13 Of course, Turkey’s ties with Russia and Iran bring with them fraught
political considerations and a degree of political vulnerability—concerns that
are also shared by the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
and the European Union (EU). Turkey’s strong energy and trade relationships with
its powerful neighbors rely on relative political stability on all sides.14
Turkey also remains reliant on coal for about 27 percent of its total primary
energy supply,15 and imports of hard coal have doubled over the past decade.16
Coal is the only fossil fuel of which Turkey has a meaningful supply, with some
hard coal reserves in Zonguldak Province and significant lignite spread across
the country.17
Import dependency across these fossil fuel markets has important economic
implications, leaving Turkey’s economy vulnerable to volatile global energy
prices and substantially contributing to the current account deficit. When
energy prices peaked in 2014, for example, Turkey’s energy import costs reached
US$53 billion. In 2017, import costs declined to US$36 billion following the
decline in global energy prices.18 In view of recent developments, as well as
forecasts for the remainder of 2018 and growing energy demand in Turkey and
globally, the import bill is likely to remain high given the volatility in
energy prices.19 The latest Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey data show
that the current account deficit reached US$53.4 billion between February 2017
and February 2018, with energy imports comprising the largest part of that
shortfall.20
Driving the transition away from imported fossil fuels and toward domestically
produced renewable energy is therefore a crucial priority for Turkey.
Prioritizing the use of domestic renewable energy will reduce Turkey’s political
reliance on energy exporters such as Iran or Russia as well as insulate Turkey
against price shocks and fluctuating energy prices. In 2017, for example, Turkey
generated around 7 percent of all its electricity from wind and solar, amounting
to 18.8 TWh per year.21 If Turkey were able to triple this generation to replace
electricity generated from imported fossil fuels, it would save more than US$1
billion per year in energy imports, equivalent to the annual electricity
expenditure of a medium-sized Turkish city.
Turkey’s account deficit is also deepened by its current dependence on imported
energy-related equipment and machinery. Despite Turkey’s otherwise strong
manufacturing sector, the country’s net imports related to energy supply
equipment amounted to US$2.8 billion in 2015, equivalent to 1 percent of overall
net trade imports. This is driven in part by rising imports of renewable energy
equipment, which have grown recently by 5 percent per year. China, Germany, and
Italy represent half of all imports. Turkey is, however, a net exporter of wind
equipment, with a total volume of US$1.1 billion per year, but this was
outweighed by net solar and coal equipment imports with a total volume of US$4.2
billion per year in 2015.22
JOBS AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
The energy transition will bring benefits and opportunities beyond saved import
costs and an improved balance of trade; it could also drive badly needed
value-added manufacturing and employment. Turkey’s auction system for energy
tenders aimed to reverse the trade imbalance—particularly in electricity
generation equipment—and foster broader domestic economic development.
Under the new system, bidders that win auctions to develop solar or wind fields
are required to manufacture and use equipment that is at least two-thirds
locally produced. This aims to drive economic activity and incentivize Turkey’s
local production capacity. This sort of higher value-added equipment
manufacturing is essential to Turkey’s broader economic agenda as well as to its
efforts to create jobs and avoid the middle-income trap.23 It is also important
that Turkey develop a strategy that offers a long-term view of the gigawatt-size
market while creating investor confidence.
By the end of 2017, about 84,000 people were already employed in Turkey’s
renewable energy sector, primarily in the solar industry.24 (see Figure 2) By
comparison, the entire legacy electricity and gas sector employs a total of
819,000 people—and only directly employs one-third of that number.25 Indeed,
local content requirements will drive up economic activity and create new jobs,
but one should also consider the upfront costs and time needed to create a
domestic manufacturing base. Turkish stakeholders should factor in these
considerations when planning for the country’s energy transition in order to
avoid both delays and increases in the current account deficit.
ENVIRONMENT
Finally, the energy transition could have dramatic positive impacts on the
environment and human health. These positive results would stem from avoiding
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and air pollutants that are released during
the conversion of fossil fuels into final energy products such as gasoline,
diesel, or electricity, as well as the consumption of these products in power
plants, transport, and heating or cooking.
Local air pollution is a growing concern in Turkey: 97 percent of the country’s
urban population is exposed to particulate matter emissions higher than the EU
and World Health Organization limits. In 2010, an estimated 29,000 premature
deaths in Turkey were attributed to exposure to particulate matter and ozone
emissions.26 A recent study shows that just 6 out of 81 surveyed cities meet the
air pollution standards for sulfur dioxide and particulate matter.27
Perhaps more profound in the long run are the effects Turkey’s energy transition
could have on global climate change, which stands to upend modern life and
reshape economies and societies wholesale in the coming century. Turkey’s
energy-related CO2 emissions reached 317 million tons (Mt) in 2015. Emissions
from coal—by far the most emission-intensive fuel—used for electricity
generation represented more than 40 percent of this total. In 2015, the sectoral
breakdown of the country’s total emissions was as follows: 40 percent for
electricity generation; 23 percent for transport; 14 percent for manufacturing,
industry, and construction; 9 percent for residential buildings; and 14 percent
for commercial buildings and smaller sectors such as agriculture and forestry.28
When non-CO2 greenhouse gases (GHG) are included, Turkey is the world’s
20th-largest emitter of GHG and ranks first in terms of GHG emissions growth
among Annex I countries since 2006 given its rapidly growing energy demand and
population.29 If its emission growth rate continues to increase at its current
pace, Turkey could become one of the world’s largest emitters by 2030, making it
a crucial crossroads country for global mitigation efforts.30 The advancement of
Turkey’s energy transition will therefore contribute to improved health and
well-being in the country and make a meaningful contribution to the global
effort to mitigate climate change.
THE CURRENT STANDING AND FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES OF TURKEY’S ENERGY SYSTEM
The economic, strategic, environmental, and health factors outlined above all
point to the potential benefits of a well-planned energy transition. This
section offers an overview of the Turkish government’s current strategies and
action plans to drive the country’s energy transition. Many of these plans have
a target date of 2023, the centenary of the Turkish Republic.
While the ambitious goals set out in these planning documents are welcome, the
planning process would benefit from a more extended timeline, deconfliction
between strategic plans, and inclusion of lessons learned from other countries.
OVERVIEW OF EXISTING NATIONAL ENERGY AND CLIMATE STRATEGY AND POLICIES
Turkey has signed but not yet ratified the Paris climate agreement.31 Its
Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) under the agreement projects
that, according to its business-as-usual scenario, Turkey’s GHG emissions will
grow 2.5 times between 2015—when it stood at 415 Mt CO2 equivalent—and 2030.32
The mitigation scenario Turkey introduced to meet its obligations proposes a 21
percent reduction by 2030. Turkey’s INDC relies on the rapid deployment of
renewables, mainly in the power sector, and improved energy efficiency across
the entire energy system.
However, Turkey is in an unusual position with respect to its climate policy.
Turkey is a founding member of the OECD grouping of developed economies and is
therefore often treated as a developed country; but in the climate context,
Turkey regards itself outside of this definition. There are no established
criteria to define countries as developed or developing, and Turkey falls
somewhere in between depending on the context.33 Indeed, Turkey has thus far
been a low emitter of CO2 and a small consumer of energy per capita, yet the
country aspires to become one of the largest world economies and is on the path
to becoming one of the largest CO2-emitting countries in the world. This future
would leave Turkey with a “critically insufficient” INDC pledge.34 Turkey has
delayed ratifying the Paris climate agreement, hoping for differentiation from
the developed industrial Annex I countries that would allow Turkey access to
international climate finance.
The Turkish government has put forward a number of plans outlining how it
intends to transform the energy sector. Measures to improve energy efficiency
form the core of these strategies, as efficiency improvements cut across all
sectors that must contribute to Turkey’s long-term targets. Most recently, in
January 2018, the government released a National Energy Efficiency Action Plan
(NEEAP) that outlines 55 detailed actions in all six energy sectors—industry,
transport, buildings, agriculture, energy generation, and cross-cutting
issues—that would reduce Turkey’s primary energy demand by 14 percent by 2023.
In fulfilling this target, the government estimates the actions will attract a
US$10.9 billion investment over this period.35
Alongside these efficiency guidelines, the government has laid out a vision for
the expansion of the renewable energy sector. The 2014 National Renewable Energy
Action Plan provides overall renewable energy deployment targets through 2023 by
energy sector and technology.36 These targets match those of the Electricity
Energy Market and Security of Supply Strategy, calling for 34 gigawatts (GW)
installed capacity of hydropower, 20 GW of wind, 5 GW of solar, 1 GW of
geothermal, and 1 GW of biomass by 2023.37
Taken together, these various strategies to 2023 cover Turkey’s approach to
energy efficiency, renewable energy, and climate change in great detail. Several
issues, however, warrant further attention from policymakers. Turkey’s energy
and climate strategies focus on 2023—the centenary of the Republic. Numerous
country examples demonstrate the need for longer-term policies to allow market
certainty for the private sector. Currently, much of Turkey’s policy focus is on
the next five years. The power sector’s role is undoubtedly crucial for energy
transition, but the focus must be broadened to include renewable energy’s roles
in buildings, industry, and transport with a long-term focus and to accelerate
the uptake of all low-carbon technologies in these sectors.
In view of the rapid technological and market changes, targets need to be
updated continuously. This will help provide certainty for investors. While
existing technologies can and will drive much of Turkey’s energy transition
system, in order to achieve significant reductions in GHG emissions, further
innovation, research, and development will be necessary for the deployment of
new low-carbon technologies. In some of these burgeoning technological fields,
Turkey may be able to carve out a competitive market position.
The key to these strategies will be implementation: Achieving an effective
energy transition will require new regulations, policy instruments, financing,
and business models. Turkey has prioritized its energy regulatory framework in
recent years, for example, by raising building energy efficiency regulations and
making them compatible with the EU Energy Efficiency Directive.38 It also
released two action plans on renewables and efficiency that align with EU
requirements. To ensure a cost-competitive transition to a low-carbon economy,
financing must be ensured, and related mechanisms and business models need to be
in place to drive investments and the overhaul of the energy sector.
International finance institutions and programs such as the World Bank, the
Global Environment Facility, and the EU’s Instrument for Pre-accession
Assistance (IPA) have supported Turkey’s energy efficiency implementation
through loans—often on favorable financial terms—and technical assistance. The
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development also has a portfolio of around
€1 billion in the Turkish energy sector, mainly directed toward renewable energy
capacity.39 Similarly, the European Investment Bank sets aside large sums of
money out of its €500 million portfolio of loans across various sectors.40
THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF THE ELECTRICITY GENERATION SECTOR
Turkey’s energy system has seen a considerable transformation over the past
decade. In an effort to liberalize the power market, incentivize investments,
and improve the efficiency of the system, the government has privatized large
shares of the legacy thermal power fleet and built new gas- and coal-fired power
and wind plants. Parallel to these efforts, a wholesale market was introduced,
the distribution system was privatized, and the Turkish power system was
connected synchronously to the European Network of Transmission System
Operators.41
Indeed, developments in 2017 were unprecedented, as economic arguments started
to work in favor of disruptive solar and wind development. The latest solar
tender in Karapınar was finalized at US$0.0699 per kilowatt hour (kWh), and wind
was finalized at US$0.0348 per kWh. By comparison, the recent lignite coal
tender in Çayırhan resulted in a power purchase agreement at US$0.0604 per kWh,
and the nuclear power plant under construction in Akkuyu has a guaranteed
electricity sales price of US$0.125 per kWh.42
Beyond the favorable auction results, two-thirds of the net capacity additions
came from renewable energy sources, of which solar and wind represented
three-quarters. Despite the need to increase domestic production, planned
electricity generation capacity continues to focus more on conventional
power-generation technologies than on renewables. For example, Turkey has
roughly 25 GW of coal-fired generation capacity in the permitting process.43
Compare that with the recently unveiled plans to include a 1 GW tender for an
offshore wind park as part of the plan to build an additional 10 GW of renewable
generation over the next 10 years. (Note that this plan is not necessarily a
part of Turkey’s current targets to reach 25 GW installed wind and solar
capacity by 2023).44 Taken together, these developments mean that renewable
energy accounted for 28.5 percent of all electricity generation by the end of
2017. The share of solar and wind power was at 7.1 percent from a total
generation of 18.8 TWh and a total installed capacity of 6.5 GW of wind and 3.4
GW of solar. Turkey also ranks fourth in the world in geothermal power use, with
its total installed generation capacity exceeding 1 GW.45
There are also vast opportunities in building-integrated rooftop photovoltaics
(PV) which convert sunlight into usable electricity. Nearly 500 million square
meters across residential, commercial, and public buildings hold a market
potential for up to 4 GW of installed capacity to be reached by 2026. This is a
conservative estimate that considers grid capacity, growth in sales of rooftop
systems, income levels, and creditworthiness. The technical potential reaches 47
GW, of which half is in residential buildings.46 With regulations now in place
to govern the use of rooftop systems, investments are expected to accelerate,
offering to those with capital a cost-competitive alternative to household
electricity prices. The challenge remains to widen access to financing for
rooftop solar projects with payback periods that can easily reach up to 10
years, even in regions with frequent sunshine. To address this challenge,
several options are worth consideration, including self-consumption, net
metering, and net billing models. The rollout of business models such as
peer-to-peer trade systems will also be important.
As renewable energy generation increases, the question of how to integrate
fluctuating, distributed power generation while ensuring secure and reliable
operation of the grid is paramount. As part of its 10-year network development
plan, transmission system operator Türkiye Elektrik İletim Anonim Şirketi
(TEİAŞ) plans for about 20 GW solar and wind capacity by 2026 (14 GW wind and 6
GW solar). It anticipates that these sources will cover 11 percent of total
output by that year. This likely underestimates the share of renewable energy in
the system, considering recent market developments and government announcements;
TEİAŞ and other energy planners should prepare for a more rapid change.47
Such changes need not be expensive infrastructure updates. A recent SHURA Energy
Transition Center study—based on an hourly power market and network model—found
that Turkey could double its planned solar and wind capacity to 40 GW by 2026
with no major changes in its grid operations and transmission grid
investments.48 Moreover, up to 60 GW solar and wind capacity could be integrated
with an additional investment of 10 percent compared with TEİAŞ’s plans,
provided that new renewable energy capacity is placed close to demand centers
and where the transmission grid is stronger and system flexibility is
improved.49 Recognizing the importance of providing low-cost grid flexibility,
the Republic of Turkey Energy Market Authority (EPDK) released a smart grid road
map in April 2018, laying out a technological strategy for the energy transition
through 2025.50 Turkey’s Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources has also
agreed with Electricity of France (EDF) to work on a battery storage to help
insulate the grid against variations in its renewable energy production road
map.51
Despite these promising developments, several issues require more attention if
Turkey is to achieve higher shares of renewable energy generation. Currently,
the majority of installed solar PV capacity falls under unlicensed capacity from
smaller-scale plants.52 When solar power emerged, the focus was on licensed
capacity, but investors have now shifted to unlicensed capacity for technical
and economic reasons and, in 2017, to installations with 1 GW capacity.53
However, the regulatory framework should allow small-scale investors to continue
investing profitably in new projects.54 Otherwise, it is likely that smaller
investors could shift to markets outside of Turkey which potentially benefit
from high feed-in tariffs or do not constrain smaller entrants. A second issue
is the Energy Market Regulatory Authority’s (EMRA) decision to postpone 2 GW
license applications for wind until 2020—this delay in preliminary license
applications comes at a crucial time in the competitive development of the field
and should be revisited. Questions also remain about how future auctions will be
designed—whether average plant sizes will be smaller or even whether
smaller-scale parcel-based designs will be preferred. Identifying the locations
will also be essential, considering that the SHURA analysis results show that
plants are most beneficial to the power system when electricity is generated
close to where it is consumed.55
Finally, early 2018 has seen the introduction of two mechanisms that will
artificially protect coal- and gas-based capacity even against less expensive
renewables: purchase guarantees for generators using domestic coal and a mix of
domestic and imported coal; and the capacity market mechanisms to help ensure
the security and reliability of the electricity markets through payments.56
Capacity market mechanisms are common in many countries but can lead to high
electricity costs for consumers if they are not well-designed, while suppliers
can fail to provide the required security if compliance is not monitored. There
is little reason to protect or incentivize these legacy systems, especially
since alternative instruments exist that can provide the same services to secure
supply.57
THE NEED FOR EFFICIENCY AND ADAPTATION IN END-USE SECTORS
Turkey’s total final energy demand can be broken down between residential and
commercial buildings that represent the largest share at around 35 percent,
followed by industry with a 28 percent share, and transport with a 26 percent
share. The remaining 11 percent is used in other, smaller sectors. Turkey’s
energy efficiency improved on average by 1.8 percent per year in the period
between 2000 and 2016.58 Buildings, the largest energy-consuming sector, has
improved its energy efficiency less than in all other sectors.59
BUILDINGS AND INDUSTRY
Half of all electricity is used in buildings, with much of the remainder used in
industry. Buildings are the largest consumer of renewable energy, making up 30
percent of total primary renewable energy supply.60 The majority of this energy,
however, is consumed through inefficient traditional combustion techniques—for
example, by burning biomass such as wood. Turkey is among the leading countries
for solar water heater installations, but technology and infrastructure quality
needs to improve significantly, and there is a gap between countries with
similar resource availability or advanced policies, such as Austria, China,
Cyprus, and Israel.61
A large share of energy is used in buildings and offers untapped potential for
other renewables such as direct geothermal and heat pump applications.
Furthermore, as variable renewable energy comprises a larger share of generation
in the coming years, smart home systems and demand response will be key to
providing badly needed grid flexibility. Turkey has gradually improved its
energy efficiency policy for buildings, for example, by updating the 2008
regulation regarding buildings’ energy performance in 2013 to provide new energy
performance standards for new and renovated buildings.62 Although Turkey still
lags behind EU standards, efforts are underway to align with these and other
international policy benchmarks. The dramatic urban transformation of Turkey’s
major cities offers significant opportunities to invest in energy efficient
equipment and building design.
There are thousands of industrial production facilities scattered across Turkey,
including several energy-intensive industrial sectors such as iron and steel,
cement, ceramics, and glass production. Unlike the building sector, however, the
manufacturing sector is defined by the drive for competitiveness. This is
essential to the Turkish government’s efforts to escape the middle-income
trap.63 Hence efficiency investments usually only take place when payback
periods are short—unless government policy incentivizes or pushes a faster
transition. Overall, Turkey’s industrial sector offers untapped potential for
renewable energy and energy efficiency, but it must contend with the challenge
of scattered geography and strong competitive pressures. Industrial plants are
spread across Turkey and consume energy at different levels, requiring tailored
made solutions to supply low-carbon energy solutions. And Turkish industry faces
strong pressure to remain cost-competitive globally, leaving little room for
experimentation.64
TRANSPORT
Transport is the largest user of all fuels—both fossil and renewables—in Turkey,
representing more than 40 percent of all fuel demand, excluding the demand of
the electricity sector.65 Oil and its products, as well as a very small share
for gas, are predominantly used to cover transport energy demand. Only 500
electric vehicles were in use by the end of 2017 out of a total of 11.5 million
vehicles in the country. Hybrid cars have fared slightly better, with more than
4,000 sold by the end of 2017 thanks to tax reduction support and the
introduction of newer models.66 The EMRA is also planning to release new
licensing guidelines to encourage investments in charging infrastructure in the
hopes of incentivizing electric vehicle sales in the coming years.67
Despite these developments, Turkey’s end-use sectors are lagging behind the
progress made in the use of renewable energy technologies in the power sector.
In addition, energy efficiency improvements in both electricity and heating
demand need to be accelerated significantly in order to ensure that Turkey
achieves a complete transition of its energy system.
In sum, Turkey’s policy priority is to minimize energy imports by utilizing
local resources of energy efficiency, renewable energy, and others with the aim
of reducing its current account deficit. As Turkey strives to achieve this, it
continues to invest in coal-fired generation despite cost-competitiveness of
renewable energy such as wind and solar PV in recent tenders. Turkey’s renewable
energy and climate plans are ambitious; however, overlapping strategies and a
singular focus on 2023 hold back efforts to outline a long-term vision. Finally,
progress in renewable energy electricity generation has not yet been accompanied
by large-scale efforts to deploy low-carbon technologies for transport, heating,
and cooling.
LESSONS FROM THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY
The global energy sector has entered a new period of energy transition driven by
the progress in technology, markets, and policies. Solar PV costs have declined
by 80 percent since 2009, and the trend is continuing; wind turbine costs were
halved in the same period, though costs still vary between countries. In 2017,
the cost of electricity generation from wind averaged US$0.06 per kWh worldwide.
Several solar projects have also been offered at US$0.03 per kWh.68 As a result,
the power generation sector has seen substantial renewable energy capacity
additions in the past five years.69 For instance, renewables represented nearly
90 percent of new capacity additions in the EU in 2016. Rapid progress has led
countries to raise their ambitions for renewable capacity, and the EU has
recently agreed on a renewable energy target of 32 percent by 2030.70 India is
likely to exceed its 175 GW renewable power target for 2022, set just two years
ago. Globally, 167 GW of renewable power were commissioned in 2017, up more than
8 percent from 2016 and far outpacing the 70 GW of net fossil fuel generating
capacity added in the same year.71
Fortunately, Turkey confronts the challenges discussed above at a time of rapid
change in energy markets and tremendous opportunities for countries committed to
reshaping their energy production and consumption. Turkey can draw on several
examples of how to drive the transition to a sustainable energy system,
particularly because its energy transition is not taking place in a vacuum.
There are substantial lessons to be drawn from the experiences of the United
States and Germany—two countries that have pioneered different areas of the
wider global energy transition and uncovered hurdles of which Turkish
policymakers and entrepreneurs should be wary.
THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, the rapid rise of domestic natural gas production and a
concerted policy effort—including tax incentives for wind and solar—drove a
profound transformation across the energy sector. The rapid progress in the
fields of renewable energy and energy efficiency benefited from thorough grid
analysis, strong innovation, research, and development; the fields were also
subsequently bolstered by developments in electric vehicles and battery
storage.72 Together, these technological and market developments drove economic
growth alongside emissions reductions and environmental improvements. Indeed,
from 2000 to 2014, the U.S. economy grew by 28 percent, while GHG emissions
declined by 6 percent.73
The U.S. case also demonstrates the employment benefits that Turkey could
realize from embracing renewables and energy efficiency. In the first quarter of
2016, 2.2 million Americans worked in energy efficiency jobs, an increase of 7
percent from the previous year. Solar electric generation accounted for 374,000
employees in 2016, a 24.5 percent increase from the previous year,74 while solar
industry employment increased by 20 percent per year from 2015 to 2017.75 More
recently, however, policy uncertainty has contributed to the first job losses in
the solar industry since 2010.76 Wind power, meanwhile, employed 77,000 workers
in 2015 and nearly 102,000 workers in 2016—a 32 percent increase.77
This long-term employment growth is driven in large part by the rapid expansion
of both utility-scale and distributed renewable power. Utility-scale solar
electric generation expanded 40 times over since 2008—from 0.86 TWh to 36.8 TWh,
or from 0.02 percent to 0.9 percent of total generation.78 Costs have declined
rapidly as the industry has scaled up, with residential solar PV costs falling
from US$0.42 to US$0.18 per kWh of electricity generated, spurring further
growth in distributed solar PV installation. In the Los Angeles area, the median
generation cost of systems with size less than 20 kW was nearly halved between
2010 and 2016, from US$0.50 to US$0.28 per kWh. Costs of all systems ranged
between US$0.1 and US$0.4 per kWh in 2016, with many systems reaching grid
parity compared with the average electricity prices of US$0.1 to US$0.25 per
kWh.79 Utility-scale solar PV costs fell from US$0.27 to US$0.07 per kWh between
2010 and 2016.
The U.S. Department of Energy helped finance the first five large solar PV
plants through loan guarantees.80 This financing mechanism and subsequent due
diligence helped prove the technology’s viability at scale and led the private
sector to build 45 large solar projects—projects with greater than 100 MW in
power. Turkey would benefit from the work done in other countries to demonstrate
the success of large-scale clean energy technology. Distributed solar generation
has also grown rapidly from 11.2 million megawatt hours (MWh) in 2014 to about
19.5 million MWh in 2016, a 70 percent increase.81 Distributed solar generation
has gained significant market share in recent years, with residential and
nonresidential rooftop systems driving rapid growth.82
Wind power has also grown rapidly, with generation quadrupling from 55.4 TWh to
226.9 TWh between 2008 and 2016, or 1.3 percent to 5.6 percent of total
electricity generation.83 While significant hurdles to expanded wind power
remain—related to project finance, transmission access, zoning, and particularly
the massive offshore wind potential of the United States—efforts are moving
forward at the state level despite a recalcitrant federal government.84
The growth of these renewable sources, energy efficiency, and, most importantly,
domestic natural gas has massively reduced the importance of coal in U.S.
electricity generation and provided huge environmental benefits. Coal’s share of
electricity generation fell from 48 percent of overall supply across all sectors
in 2008 to just 30 percent in 2016.85 While it would be unrealistic for Turkey
to recreate the U.S. shale boom that drove much of this decline by undercutting
coal on price, effective government policy can also play a role.86
More than regulating legacy power production, however, the United States has had
success with incentives such as the investment tax credit for solar power and
the production tax credit for wind and other renewables. By extending to the
nascent renewable energy sector, the favorable tax treatment long-enjoyed by the
fossil fuel industry in its exploratory and development phases, the incentives
leveled the playing field and helped encourage the scaling-up of renewable
investments, which have in turn made new wind and solar projects
cost-competitive in many areas.87 Having largely achieved the goal of standing
up a competitive wind power industry, the production tax credit is now in the
process of being phased out.88
The United States’ strides in energy efficiency, once again prodded by proactive
government action, could hold lessons for Turkey. The United States’ most
dramatic step was the 2012 emissions and fuel economy standards for cars and
light trucks, which required new vehicles to average more than 50 miles per
gallon by 2025.89 While the standards are now the subject of prolonged legal
disputes, the announcement prompted a meaningful course adjustment from American
auto manufacturers, who have already shifted development plans to meet the
higher expectations.90 At the state level, California has led the way in driving
the adoption of hybrid, electric, and other zero-emission vehicles through sales
quotas, tax rebates, and perks that include access to high-occupancy vehicle
lanes. The steps have worked. According to The New York Times, there are now
370,000 such cars on the road in California, and electric vehicles comprised
nearly 5 percent of the state’s car sales in 2017.91
California’s success in cutting emissions from transport points to a key
advantage of the United States—its innovative capacity and emphasis on
technological development. The American clean energy market was early in
recognizing that renewable energy generation held even greater potential if it
could be effectively paired with electric vehicles, seizing an early market
leadership role in the space.92 American companies have likewise invested
heavily in distributed storage and battery technology, adding behind-the-meter
storage capacity to provide backup power and stockpile solar energy from rooftop
panels for cloudy periods. These technological developments are often, in part,
spurred by federal or state research grants or pilot programs. Pilot microgrid
programs in California, Michigan, New York, and Oregon now seek to network these
residential and commercial systems to boost the resilience and flexibility for
the wider grid.93
Other forms of energy efficiency—for example, in heating, cooling, insulating,
and lighting buildings—have also played a major role in reducing U.S. emissions
and forming new markets. The use of light-emitting diode (LED) light bulbs has
taken off in the past decade, from just 400,000 installed nationwide in 2009 to
more than 400 million installed in 2016; each LED bulb uses about 75 percent
less energy than a conventional incandescent bulb.94 Efficiency improvements
brought meaningful declines in energy intensity by end use per floor area in
U.S. residences between 2000 and 2015, with the biggest efficiency gains made in
space heating, lighting, and water heating.95 Similar to electricity generation,
embracing energy efficiency has been a job creator for the United States. For
example, one-fifth of the 6.5 million construction workers in the United States
work to support the installation of energy-efficient technologies.96
While the private sector has usually taken the lead in scaling these
technological developments, it has had help and direction from the federal
government. Public investment from the U.S. Department of Energy through
universities and national laboratories has been crucial to driving basic and
applied research; the department increased its annual spending on renewable
energy research and development from US$1.2 billion to US$2.1 billion a year
from 2008 to 2016. Research and development for solar and wind increased from
US$215 million to US$337 million over the same period, with spending on research
into energy efficiency in vehicles, buildings, and manufacturing rising from
US$379 million to US$739 million.97
GERMANY
Germany has engineered a profound transformation of its energy markets through a
long-term process of policy interventions, market design, and citizen
participation. This profound transformation has been labeled the so-called
Energiewende.
The Energiewende offers an example of how to transition an energy system
steadily through long-term planning and policy stability. In 2017, renewable
electricity generation hit a new record high at 218 TWh—up from 38 TWh in
2000.98 This increase was due to the rapid expansion of wind farms and solar PV
in the past 15 years. Renewables now cover 36 percent of the country’s total
electricity demand—an impressive achievement in the world’s fourth-largest
economy. This expansion continues to successfully drive a large manufacturing
industry sector—and is more than what was achieved in other large renewable
energy-producing countries.99
Germany’s power system operators have been able to integrate more than 22
percent of fluctuating solar and wind generation while maintaining security of
supply at world-record levels.100 They achieved this through a combination of
high-quality grid infrastructure and strong interconnections with neighboring
countries, more flexible thermal power plants, and a pioneering approach to
develop specific grid code requirements for variable renewable energy units. In
view of Germany’s ambitions to increase this share further, its energy policy
now focuses on enabling flexibility measures such as smart grids and
metering—combining electricity, heating, and transport sectors locally—and
continuing to improve cross-border exchange and balancing of supply and
demand.101
The example of Germany—not to mention Denmark, another pioneering country when
it comes to wind power integration102—underlines the critical role governments
play in creating the secure, long-term policy frameworks necessary for the
private sector and civil society to engage productively.
Since the 1990s, the expansion of renewable energy in Germany has been promoted
with various regulatory tools—most notably the Renewable Energy Act (EEG)
introduced in 2000. The EEG guarantees reliable investment conditions to
producers of renewable electricity. Over the years, EEG has been continuously
modified, with each new set of rules stimulating innovation to speed up
technological development and cost digression as well as to improve the
integration of electricity from renewables into grid and market.103 With new EEG
rules, the mid- and long-term targets have been raised, most recently to cover
65 percent of power demand by 2030.104
Over this same period of time, a national consensus around both energy
efficiency and renewable energy was built based on the philosophy of enabling
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and citizens to take ownership of the energy
transition. The feed-in tariffs for renewable producers large and small have
driven investment, with more than 1.5 million solar installations and 30,000
wind turbines operating country-wide, many of them solar PV rooftop
installations or wind farms developed and owned by local cooperatives.105
This reliable policy framework, which focused on stripping off-take risks from
investors by guaranteeing grid connection, priority grid access, and feed-in
premiums, has been instrumental in reducing the cost of wind and solar power by
between 50 percent and 90 percent in just a decade. The cost is now as low as
US$0.04–US$0.05 per kWh, and today, wind and solar are the cheapest choices for
new electricity generation.106
The Energiewende has driven an investment program, encouraging growth and
innovation in new low-carbon sectors—such as renewable energy, energy
efficiency, new energy services, and alternative transportation. Total
investment in renewable energy across all sectors from 2000 to 2015 was €235
billion, corresponding to an annual average of €16 billion.107 These investments
have contributed to Germany’s competitiveness in low-carbon technologies while
also supporting economic growth. The Energiewende has also had an important
impact on the employment structure of the energy sector. In 2017, the renewable
industry alone accounted for approximately 332,000 jobs—twice as many as in
2004.108
As for its positive outcomes, the challenges of the Energiewende are equally
helpful for Turkey in formulating its renewable energy policies. These include
the relatively high cost burden of inflexible feed-in tariffs on consumers in
the past; the shortcomings of CO2 pricing policies, an issue that was present in
other EU countries; insufficient grid capacity to transmit wind produced in the
north to the consumers in the south; and the difficulties in implementing
renewables and energy efficiency measures in sectors outside of electricity
generation such as transport and buildings.
The feed-in tariffs, which are financed through consumer electrical bills, have
put an extra burden on households. Electricity bills in Germany are almost twice
as high as those in France and 40 percent higher than the EU average.109 Germany
began developing renewables when they were still more expensive than their
conventional counterpart. More importantly, tariffs were not adjusted quickly
enough when costs decreased, allowing investors to build GW-size solar
generation at high feed-in tariffs, creating windfall profits. Meanwhile,
wholesale electricity prices for the manufacturing industry are among the lowest
in the EU due to exemptions for certain industries. After years of increases,
electricity prices for German households have been relatively stable since 2013.
The underlying reason for this is that new renewable power plants have costs
comparable to those of new conventional power plants, and power purchase
agreements for renewables follow real costs more closely.110
The rapid transformation of the sector has also brought major transmission and
distribution integration challenges, scrambling the traditional grid designed to
carry power from large stations to industries and consumers. This change was
boosted by hundreds of thousands of small so-called prosumers emerging in the
market that both consume and feed electricity into grid.111 Updating the system
to cope with these new dynamics requires investment in smart meters and local
substations as well as better grid management software—a challenge that Turkey
should anticipate and for which it should plan.112 Germany also has far more
favorable wind energy conditions in the north and that is the region in which
renewable generation has grown the fastest. The challenge of strengthening
transmission capacities from the north to centers of industry and population in
the west and south has tested the political and technical capacity of German
federal and state governments, as transmission system operators faced resistance
from local communities in densely populated central Germany.113 Ensuring that
build-ups of renewables and grid capacity are coordinated well is a key issue.
The rapid transformation of Germany’s electricity generation sector has moved
beyond its strides in other fields as well. With uneven distribution of taxes,
surcharges, and levies, emissions from transportation have increased with a
growing economy.114 Moving forward, the new governing coalition has committed to
phasing out coal power and meeting emissions reduction goals in line with the
Paris climate agreement, which was ratified by Germany in 2016.115 It has also
pledged action on the transport and heating sectors.116 In this next phase of
the energy transition, therefore, attention is to be focused on integrating
sectoral policies to develop a consistent strategy to decarbonize the power,
transport, and heating sectors efficiently and to overcome the mismatch of
sectoral incentives currently in place.117
The United States and Germany offer useful lessons for Turkey as it continues
its energy transition. The American and German examples highlight the importance
of grid planning and flexibility; the need for government incentives and direct
investments in research and development, technology, and pilot programs; the
predictable and in many ways positive challenges brought by rapid growth of
distributed generation; and the crucial importance of improving energy
efficiency and the use of renewables in sectors beyond the power sector.
CONCLUSION: NEXT STEPS IN TURKEY’S ENERGY TRANSITION
Turkey has joined the global trend to transition its energy system. Wind is
already competitive, and new solar PV plants are nearing cost parity with fossil
fuel generation. Turkey has seen promising recent developments in the two
pillars of overall energy transition: energy efficiency and renewable energy
production. Further development of secure, affordable, and sustainable energy
supplies in Turkey will require action across the energy sector—including in the
fields of technology, policy, finance, and business. Experiences from across the
globe can help Turkey accelerate its progress and close the gap to become a
leading player in the global energy transition.
The following five suggestions deserve the consideration of Turkey’s
policymakers, investors, technology developers, financiers, and other
stakeholders.
SET LONG-TERM GOALS FOR THE ENERGY TRANSITION
Credible and attainable long-term energy and climate goals—and the development
of strategies to support those goals—have been essential to many countries’
successful energy transitions. These goals help create a predictable and
favorable policy environment for investors. As Turkey pursues its 2023 targets,
it should start by defining its post-2023 objectives and working backwards to
set achievable milestones, as it will take years to formulate the supporting
policies and mechanisms.
PLAN FOR POWER SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION
As solar and wind power add larger shares to Turkey’s electricity mix, grid
management and planning will become more important than ever. Demand is
clustered mainly in the west, so balancing variable generation from different
sources across Turkey will be challenging. Ensuring the flexibility of the
system and building a system that takes resource availability, demand patterns,
and grid infrastructure into account will be key to meeting this challenge.
SHURA’s recently released grid integration study offers concrete steps to help
achieve these goals.
COMBINE THE BENEFITS OF LARGE- AND SMALL-SCALE INVESTMENTS
The share of distributed generation is growing in all countries. Distributed
generation brings multiple benefits to the system when electricity is consumed
where it is produced, such as better load management and system reliability,
improved power quality, and decreased need for costly grid investments.
Distributed assets also help diversify ownership and create opportunities for
local actors to participate in the market. Utility-scale power plants,
meanwhile, bring benefits from economies of scale. By smartly combining
distributed and utility generation in its new policy mechanisms, Turkey can
enjoy the benefits of both approaches as it enlarges its renewable energy
markets.
DRIVE INNOVATION IN TECHNOLOGY AND ENABLING SYSTEMS
Renewable costs have declined significantly in recent decades due in large part
to technologies and strategies to integrate renewables into the energy
system.118 This technological innovation has played a key role in early stages
of the global energy transition and will continue to be essential to improving
the efficiency of existing technologies, further driving down costs, and
developing breakthroughs such as digitalization and energy storage. Turkey
stands to benefit tremendously if it can develop a strong technology base that
favors local development. Doing so, however, will require the cooperation of
both the public and private sectors. And this innovation, research, and
development cannot be limited to the technical side. It will also need to expand
across financing, market design, and business models as Turkey’s energy
transition enters its next stages.
UTILIZE THE POTENTIAL OF RENEWABLES AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE TRANSPORT,
HEATING, AND COOLING SECTORS
A comprehensive transition of the energy system will require the deployment of
both energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies across all sectors of
the energy system. This includes the power sector and those sectors consuming
energy—namely transport, production of bulk materials such as steel and cement,
and buildings. In this regard, Turkey’s recently released NEEAP is an important
step forward. Efforts should go beyond the current plans, however, while also
meeting Turkey’s rapidly growing energy demand in a secure, affordable, and
sustainable way.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Deger Saygin is the director of the SHURA Energy Transition Center in Istanbul,
Turkey. He has previously worked at the International Renewable Energy Agency
(IRENA), where he developed and led the global renewable energy road map program
from 2013 to 2017. Prior to joining IRENA, Deger was a researcher at Utrecht
University focusing on sustainable energy and manufacturing projects for
intergovernmental organizations, governments, and the private sector. He
received his Ph.D. from Utrecht University and his undergraduate degree in
environmental engineering from the Middle East Technical University in Ankara,
Turkey.
Max Hoffman is the associate director for National Security and International
Policy at the Center for American Progress, focusing on Turkey and the Kurdish
regions; U.S. defense policy; and the intersection of climate change, human
migration, and security concerns. Hoffman previously worked on disarmament and
security issues for the United Nations and the U.S. House of Representatives
Armed Services Committee. Hoffman received his M.A. in history from the
University of Edinburgh in Scotland.
Philipp Godron is a senior associate for Global Energy Transition at the Agora
Energiewende, where he is responsible for international energy policies, seeking
to provide lessons learned to outside stakeholders from Germany’s energy
transition. Before joining Agora, Philipp worked for Desertec Industrial
Initiative, advised the government of Jordan on incentivizing renewables
development, and worked for the German utility E.ON. Philipp has a master’s
degree in European studies from Humboldt University in Berlin and studied
political sciences, history, and philosophy in Cologne, Germany, and Bologna,
Italy.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank their colleagues who took the time to review
draft versions of this report and provide feedback and significant improvements,
including Selahattin Hakman and Ceren Ayas, both members of the SHURA Steering
Committee, as well as Gwynne Taraska, formerly of the Center for American
Progress, and Alison Cassady and Luke Bassett of CAP. The authors would also
like to thank United Minds for Progress for its generous support of this
research.
ENDNOTES
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Kingdom, France, and Sweden.
101. SHURA Energy Transition Center and Agora Energiewende, “Assessment of
International Learnings and Good Practices of Energy Transition and Their
Applicability to the Case of Turkey.”
102. Reuters, “Denmark sets record with 43 percent of power from wind in 2017,”
January 11, 2018, available at
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-denmark-renewables-windpower/denmark-sets-record-with-43-percent-of-power-from-wind-in-2017-idUKKBN1F01VD.
103. Agora Energiewende, “The Energiewende in a nutshell: 10 Q&A on the German
energy transition” (2017), available at
https://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin2/Projekte/2017/Energiewende_in_a_nutshell/Agora_The_Energiewende_in_a_nutshell_WEB.pdf.
104. Sören Amelang, Benjamin Wehrmann, and Julian Wettengel, “Climate, energy
and transport in Germany’s coalition treaty,” Clean Energy Wire, February
7, 2018, available at
https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/climate-and-energy-germanys-government-coalition-draft-treaty.
105. Kerstine Appunn and Ruby Russell, “Set-up and challenges of Germany’s
power grid,” Clean Energy Wire, April 9, 2018, available at:
https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/set-and-challenges-germanys-power-grid.
106. Christoph Kost and others, “Studie zu Stromgestehungskosten: Photovoltaik
und Onshore-Wind sind günstigste Technologien in Deutschland,“
Fraunhofer-Institut für Solare Energiesysteme ISE, March 20, 2018,
available at
https://www.ise.fraunhofer.de/de/presse-und-medien/presseinformationen/2018/studie-zu-stromgestehungskosten-photovoltaik-und-onshore-wind-sind-guenstigste-technologien-in-deutschland.html.
107. Agora Energiewende, “The Energiewende in a nutshell” (2017), available at
https://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2017/Energiewende_in_a_nutshell/Agora_The_Energiewende_in_a_nutshell_WEB.pdf.
108. International Renewable Energy Agency, “Renewable Energy and Jobs: Annual
Review 2018” (2018), available at:
http://irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2018/May/IRENA_RE_Jobs_Annual_Review_2018.pdf;
See also Marlene O’Sullivan, Ulrike Lehr, Dietmar Edler,
“Bruttobeschäftigung durch erneuerbare Energien in
Deutschland“ (Karlsruhe, Germany: Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and
Innovation, 2015), available at
https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/B/bruttobeschaeftigung-durch-erneuerbare-energien.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=13.
109. Kerstine Appunn and Ruby Russell, “Set-up and challenges of Germany’s
power grid,” Clean Energy Wire, April 9, 2018, available at:
https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/set-and-challenges-germanys-power-grid.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. Reed, “Germany’s Shift to Green Power Stalls, Despite Huge Investments.”
115. United Nations Treaty Collection, “7. d Paris Agreement, Paris, 12
December 2015,” available at
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en
(last accessed June 2018).
116. Amelang, Wehrmann, and Wettengel, “Climate, energy and transport in
Germany’s coalition treaty,” Clean Energy Wire, February 7, 2018,
available at
https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/climate-and-energy-germanys-government-coalition-draft-treaty.
117. Agora Energiewende, “Neue Preismodelle für Energie” (2017), available at
https://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin2/Projekte/2017/Abgaben_Umlagen/Agora_Abgaben_Umlagen_WEB.pdf.
118. See, for example, International Renewable Energy Agency, “Renewable Energy
and Jobs: Annual Review 2018” (2018), available at:
http://irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2018/May/IRENA_RE_Jobs_Annual_Review_2018.pdf.
See also: International Energy Agency, “Renewables 2017,” available at
https://www.iea.org/publications/renewables2017/.
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